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This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a 
comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact 
financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, 
where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the 
primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the 
regulation of financial institutions in the United States and Europe, this Article 
touches on the issues of global regulatory reform to see if the global solution 
might fit into the structural issues of financial institutions and systems. Building 
on the discussions on convergence in bank corporate governance, it predicts 
transatlantic convergence in the financial system and structure of banking 
business preceded by convergence in the practices and strategies of financial 
institutions in the United States and Europe.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The controversial Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act1
                                            
* Associate Professor of Law, Seoul National University School of Law; Dr. Jur. (Munich); 
LL.M. (Harvard). The author has taught at Stanford, Michigan, Tel Aviv, and IDC Herzliya Law 
Schools. He thanks Johannes Bürgi and Thomas Müller of Walder Wyss, Zurich, for helpful 
materials on recent developments in Switzerland, and Kimberly Timko, Alexandra Papp and Helen 
No for excellent research assistance. 
 was signed into law on July 21, 2010. It will implement the 
sweeping financial reform that has been needed since the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in 2007. One of the hottest issues discussed in the legislative 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. For summaries, see DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL 
LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
(2010); SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: 
COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS (2010); and DEUTSCHE BANK, THE IMPLICATIONS OF LANDMARK U.S. 
REG. REFORM: THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (July 
2010); Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s-Eye View: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, in: REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW 
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 1 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011). 
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process of the Dodd-Frank Act was the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933, which separated investment banking from commercial banking. The 
reinstatement, however, did not happen; instead, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted the 
famous “Volcker-Rule,” 2 which addresses the issue, but does not introduce 
comprehensive new regulations on commercial banks’ activities in capital markets. 
Under the soft constraints newly imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act, the framework 
established by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 remains basically intact.3
The developments in the United States certainly impacts financial 
institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. The U.S. government may urge or 
encourage foreign governments to adopt the same rules if the short-term 
international competitiveness of the U.S. financial institutions may be harmed 
through the new regulation. There are provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that can 
be seen as an attempt to force harmonization of international financial regulation. 
On the other hand, European countries also may take advantage of the regulatory 
reform in the United States as new momentum in their own reform efforts. Non-
U.S. financial institutions may also voluntarily adapt to the new system when they 
go global, particularly through acquisitions.
 
4
We now have various reports on the policy decisions of different 
countries. For instance, Nigeria recently decided to abolish the universal banking 




                                            
2 “I'm proposing a simple and common-sense reform, which we're calling the “Volcker 
Rule” -- after this tall guy behind me. Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor 
hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated 
to serving their customers. If financial firms want to trade for profit, that's something they're free 
to do. Indeed, doing so – responsibly – is a good thing for the markets and the economy. But these 
firms should not be allowed to run these hedge funds and private equities funds while running a 
bank backed by the American people.” Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the 
President on Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-financial-reform.  
 Switzerland, on the contrary, saw no reason to change the 
3 Yalman Onaran, Volcker Said to Be Unhappy With New Version of Rule, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. WK. (June 30, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-30/volcker-said-to-be-
unhappy-with-new-version-of-rule.html. 
4 In the period between 1995 and 2008, 1,833 bank M&As were reported. Four hundred 
and sixty-six of them were cross-border deals. See George Andrew Karolyi & Alvaro G. Taboada, 
The Influence of Government in Cross-Border Bank Mergers 36 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573168 (also reporting that 
cross-border deals were larger in terms of the amount of deals). 
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traditional framework. They believed that the investment banking arms of the 
Swiss banks might neutralize the losses incurred by the housing loans.6
This Article explores these questions while revisiting the universal 
banking system. As universal banking is the hallmark of the European financial 
services industry,
 Other 
countries will have their own reasons and political background to apply to their 
reform in the regulation of financial institutions and markets. The response made 
by foreign governments will in turn influence U.S.-banks’ strategies in the global 
financial markets. Also, if states decide to keep the universal banking system in its 
traditional or modified form for strategic reasons, they will have to find 
alternative tools to make sure that their large financial institutions do not create 
excessive local, as well as global, systemic risk in the future.  
7
Part II lays the groundwork for analysis and comparison with a discussion 
of the economics of universal banking and the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall 
Act in the United States. Part III analyzes recent discussions for financial 
regulatory reform from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the 
United States works on European infrastructures and highlights the practical 
differences. Germany and Switzerland will be the primary jurisdictions of interest. 
Part IV explores banks’ corporate governance issues that search for solutions to 
 this paper puts the U.S. system in comparative perspective 
with the European system. It takes a historical and political look at the regulation 
of financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Historical and political 
differences in these states can provide us with answers to how these countries 
approach the restructuring of their own, as well as the global, financial services 
industry. This Article also shows that the financial services industry in the United 
States and Europe share one thing in common which goes beyond their path-
dependent limits: it is the pursuit of economies of scale and scope to effectively 
compete in global financial markets. As practices and strategies of financial 
institutions on both sides of the Atlantic converge toward each other, financial 
regulatory systems of the United States and Europe will do the same. 
                                            
6 Johnathan Lynn, Swiss Central Banker Backs Universal Bank Model-Paper, REUTERS 
(Jan. 16, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/16/swiss-banks-idUSLDE60F050201 
00116. 
7 See Georg Rich & Christian Walter, The Future of Universal Banking, 13 CATO J. 289 
(1993). See generally BANKING, TRADE AND INDUSTRY: EUROPE, AMERICA AND ASIA FROM THE 
THIRTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1997); Panagiotis K. 
Staikouras, Universal Banks, Universal Crises? Disentangling Myths from Realities in Quest of a 
New Regulatory and Supervisory Landscape, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 139 (2011). For the Dutch 
system, see Christopher Louis Colvin, Universal Banking Failure?: An Analysis of the Contrasting 
Responses of the Amsterdamsche Bank and the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging to the Dutch 
Financial Crisis of the 1920s (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 98/07, 2007). 
4
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the problems large universal banks pose to economies. It illuminates the role of 
good corporate governance for banks in financial regulatory reform. It also 
suggests that the rules and practice in corporate governance of banks in the United 
States and Europe are converging. Part V touches on the issues of global 
regulatory reform to see if the global solution might fit into the structural issues of 
financial institutions and systems. It emphasizes the need to develop international 
rules for the structure of financial institutions and importance of comparative 
financial system and regulation. It also briefly discusses the allocation of 
regulatory authority. Part VI concludes.  
II.  UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES8
A. The Issue 
 
Controversy over the separation of commercial and investment banks has 
been active since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. In popular 
terms, the issue is whether the United States should reinstate the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933.9 The Act was passed after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the 
subsequent collapse of the American banking industry. The number of banks 
decreased from 25,000 to 14,000 during the crisis. The Act required the separation 
of commercial and investment banks in order to deter deposit-taking commercial 
banks from engaging in speculative and risky activities in the capital markets, 
which was believed to have been a major cause of the crash. It was not until 1999 
when the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA).10
Twenty-five banks failed in 2008 and 140 banks failed in 2009 in the 
United States, whereas only eleven banks had failed between 2002 and 2007.
  
11
                                            
8 See generally JORDI CANALS, UNIVERSAL BANKING: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL 
BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN? WHAT COULD WE LOSE? (1994); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009). 
 
9 Erik M. Filipiak, The Creation of a Regulatory Framework: The Enactment of Glass-
Steagall (Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n,. Meeting Paper, 2009). 
10 For the GLBA, see Jolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 497 (2002); Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let 
No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009 
American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371 (2010); Edward J. Janger & Paul M. 
Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002). 
11 Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ 
banklist.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
5
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The failure of the financial institutions during the 2008 crisis cast doubts on the 
conventional wisdom of “size matters.” Economies of scale and scope can be a 
good thing in the competitive market, but they also create the so-called “Too-Big-
To-Fail”12 problem. Commercial banks’ activities related to capital markets have 
become too risky and arguably contributed to the collapse of the U.S. and global 
financial markets. Should the United States go back to the Glass-Steagall era? 
Clearly, America cannot afford another Lehman Brothers failure13 or Citigroup 
bailout. The systemic risk created by large financial institutions has become too 
big to manage.14 The complexity and magnitude of business of the leading 
financial institutions have become too great to handle for any first-class 
managers.15 The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act created big financial institutions 
in the United States. Desegregation of commercial and investment banking 
activities led to increased mergers and acquisitions in the financial services 
industry. Some of the largest among them have become too big to fail. Their 
businesses are too complicated for any software. The number of employees is so 
large that illegal or questionable practices can neither be detected nor easily 
controlled. The leading financial institutions went global without sufficient 
resources to handle cultural diversities within the organization.16 Like Japanese 
mega-banks17 they may be overwhelmed by their own size.18
                                            
12 See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 
(2009).  
 
13 For general background on the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, see generally 
LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE (2009); JOSEPH TIBMAN, 
THE MURDER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS: AN INSIDER’S LOOK AT THE GLOBAL MELTDOWN (2009); 
MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK (2010) . 
14 See George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO 
J. 17 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). See also KERN 
ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK (2006). 
15 See Alan Greenspan, Dodd-Frank Fails to Meet Test of Our Times, FIN. TIMES (March 
29, 2011, 6:31 PM ET), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14662fd8-5a28-11e0-86d3-00144feab49a.html 
(“[R]egulators, and for that matter everyone else, can never get more than a glimpse at the internal 
workings of the simplest of modern financial systems”). 
16 Harold James, Why Big Banks Will Get Bigger, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Jan. 5, 2010), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/james36/English. 
17 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good To Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind 
Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (1995). 
18 Banks expand their businesses internationally. Small economies, however, may face 
difficulties if their banks become too big for the size of their economies. Ireland and Iceland are 
good examples. Their banks grew big and went international out of the government’s effective 
6
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B. A Brief Chronology19
1. Early Years 
 
The modern banking business originated in Italy, representatively by the 
House of Medici in the 14th century, preceded by Bardi and Peruzzi of Florence.20 
The Italian mathematician Fibonacci (c. 1170–c. 1250) came up with a new 
method of calculating interest, and that stimulated lending which in turn supported 
trade.21 It is not coincidental that Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice was 
about the merchants of the 14th century. Soon, the rise of the merchant banks 
followed.22 Merchant banks stayed in close relationship with industrial firms 
through trade finance, commercial papers and equity investments. The deposit-
taking commercial banks are the products and/or companions of these merchant 
banks. So, the universal bank can be said to not be a special category of bank; 
rather, it is the original form of doing banking business, with the only exception 
being in England where banks took almost no equity participation in industrial 
firms.23




                                                                                                                       
control. As a result, the global financial crisis brought their economies down. James, supra note __. 
 It was founded in England in 1762. By the early 19th century, Baring 
19  See VINCENT CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (1970); 
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997); ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. 
WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007); JOEL SELIGMAN, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3rd ed. 2003). 
20  See RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, PREMODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 145–70 (1987); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE HOUSE OF MEDICI: ITS RISE 
AND FALL (1999); TIM PARKS, MEDICI MONEY (2006). Arguably, the first global financial 
institution was the Knights Templar. The Templar, Inc. is said to have invented the bill of exchange 
and even financed King Louis VII of France in the second crusade. See JACK CASHILL, POPES & 
BANKERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CREDIT & DEBT, FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIG 33–40 (2010); 
MICHAEL HAAG, THE TEMPLARS: THE HISTORY & THE MYTH 137–44 (2009). For a history of the 
Order, see generally MALCOLM BARBER, THE NEW KNIGHTHOOD: A HISTORY OF THE ORDER OF 
THE TEMPLE (1995); MICHAEL HAAG, THE TEMPLARS: THE HISTORY AND THE MYTH: FROM 
SOLOMON'S TEMPLE TO THE FREEMASONS (2009). 
21 See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
33–34 (2008). 
22 Cf. ERIK BANKS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MERCHANT BANKS (1999); STANLEY 
CHAPMAN, THE RISE OF MERCHANT BANKING (2006).  
23 MICHEL FLEURIET, INVESTMENT BANKING EXPLAINED 5 (2008). 
24 See DAVID S. LANDES, DYNASTIES: FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE WORLD’S 
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES 13-36 (2006).  
7
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became the most influential bank in Europe. It grew fast through the revolution 
and war financing of British governments. Baring even brokered France’s sale of 
the State of Louisiana to the United States in 1803. After Rothschild’s takeover of 
the dominant position in European banking by 1820, Baring’s business shrank. It, 
however, maintained its reputation as the oldest merchant banking house in 
Europe.25 Rothschild, which started as a competitor to Baring Bank, surpassed 
Baring in the early 19th century.26
After the Civil War, the early investment bankers began to underwrite 
U.S. railroad stocks to finance the huge industry. They then began to buy and 
distribute the stocks to European investors.
 Like Baring, Rothschild also grew through 
financing activities for dynasties and sovereign governments, particular during 
times of war. It was the absolute financial power through the 19th century. More 
importantly, it practically midwifed the investment banking industry in the United 
States through its agents, most notably August Belmont, who sold railroad bonds 
issued by the U.S. firms in Europe.  
27 This was when the American model 
of investment banking emerged. They were J.P. Morgan and Company, JW 
Seligman and Company, Kuhn Loeb, Kidder Peabody, and PaineWebber. An 
oligopolistic industry was born, with J.P. Morgan being the market leader.28 The 
“new generation” house Goldman Sachs was founded only in 1869 by Marcus 
Goldman and became a member of the New York Stock Exchange in 1896. 
Goldman Sachs established a solid alliance with Lehman Brothers, which was 
founded a little earlier in 1850.29
                                            
25 During World War II, the British government again relied upon Baring in securing 
financing for war. In 1995, however, one of Baring’s employees in Singapore lost 1.4 billion 
dollars in speculative trade. Baring ended up being sold to the Dutch ING for one pound. It finally 
disappeared in 2001 after 250 years of history.  
 
26 See NIALL FERGUSON, 1 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS: 1798-1848 
(1998); NIALL FERGUSON, 2 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: THE WORLD’S BANKER: 1849-1999 
(1998).  
27  But see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 253-54 (2006) (pointing out that “it was not until 1928 that the total value of 
publicly traded equity exceeded that of outstanding debt”). 
28 Kidder Peabody was established in 1865 and sold to General Electric in 1986, then to 
PaineWebber in 1994. PaineWebber was then merged with UBS in 2000. Kuhn Loeb was 
founded in 1867 and became the principal rival of J.P.Morgan. But, the house lost significance 
after World War II and was sold to Lehman Brothers in 1977. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb was 
acquired by American Express in 1984 forming Shearson Lehman American Express. 
29 For a history of Goldman Sachs, see CHARLES D. ELLIS, PARTNERSHIP: THE MAKING OF 
GOLDMAN SACHS (2009), LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS (1997), 
and SUZANNE MCGEE, CHASING GOLDMAN SACHS (2010). For a history of Lehman Brothers, see 
PETER CHAPMAN, THE LAST OF THE IMPERIOUS RICH: LEHMAN BROTHERS, 1844-2008 (2010). 
8
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2. J.P. Moragn and the Glass-Steagall 
John Coffee suggested that investment bankers took the role of guardians 
for public investors in the early stages of industrialization in the United States.30 
When we read Edward Rock’s fascinating description of the age of robber 
barons,31 it makes perfect sense that American investors badly needed investment 
bankers. Railroad companies did not protect minority shareholders through 
corporate governance devices. To the contrary, control group quite often 
manipulated stock prices. Through corporate governance mechanisms, investment 
banks devised a way to credibly make promises to potential investors. For 
instance, they had directorships in many banks and general corporations to 
monitor managers and businesses.32
However, the investment banking industry led by J.P. Morgan was soon 
feared by the public as it grew too fast and powerful.
  
33 J.P. Morgan controlled the 
entire financial services industry of the time, banking, securities and insurance 
included. The financial firms in turn controlled industrial firms. The Pujo 
Committee was created in 1912, and the industry was ultimately reorganized by 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.34 Commercial banking and investment banking 
were separated for very political reasons. 35  President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
antagonism against the financial industry symbolized by J.P. Morgan played a 
crucial role in the process. 36 Americans feared that the financial giant may 
jeopardize democracy.37
                                            
30  John C. Coffee, Jr., Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the 
Enduring Tension Between ‘Lumpers’ and ‘Splitters’ (European Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 144/2010, 2010). 
 J.P. Morgan ended up splitting into Morgan Guaranty 
31  Edward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Street: Speculative 
Comments at the End of the Century, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 237 (2001). 
32 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 27 – 32 (2001). 
33 See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND 
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990); JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER (2000).  
34 See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT 
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990). 
35 Cf. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE 
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Mark J. Roe, Political 
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000). 
36 LANDES, supra note __, at 85–86. 
37 Ironically, public opinion in the United States urged J.P. Morgan Chase to rescue Bear 
Stearns in 2008. Cashill, supra note __, at 228. For background on J.P. Morgan Chase, see 
9
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Trust, Morgan Stanley,38 and Morgan Grenfell of London. However, it is not 
clear if universal banking contributed to the failure of banks during the Great 
Depression. The U.S. system did not allow banks to do business outside of the 
place of their establishment because of the public sentiment that local money 
should go to local borrowers.39
The Glass-Steagall Act experienced continuous erosion in its normative 
power over the years. The U.S. banking industry regarded the Act as a roadblock 
in its fierce competition with the European universal banks in the global financial 
markets that were characterized by world-wide mergers and acquisitions.
 That prevented American banks from growing 
large and small banks were inherently vulnerable to economic crisis. 
40 The 
economies of scope could not be achieved because of the Act. At the same time, 
investment banks started to eat away at the traditional businesses of commercial 
banks. Junk bonds replaced commercial loans in the 1980s41 due to the rapid 
growth of private equity and leveraged buyouts.42
                                                                                                                       
MCDONALD, DUFF, LAST MAN STANDING: THE ASCENT OF JAMIE DIMON AND JPMORGAN CHASE 
(2009). 
 The growth of the mutual fund 
market was also a huge blow to commercial banks’ lending business. So, banks 
became offensive and expanded their business into the capital markets, 
challenging the Glass-Steagall Act. Most notably, banks began securities 
brokerage and asset management services. Litigation followed. Voluminous case 
law and practice were developed in this area. The Supreme Court of the United 
38 Cf. PATRICIA BEARD, BLUE BLOOD AND MUTINY: THE FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF MORGAN 
STANLEY (2007). 
39 See HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC 
HISTORY (2003). 
40 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975 – 2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, U. ILL. L. REV. 215–476 (2002). 
41 MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note __, at 295–96.  
42 See generally GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT: KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF 
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992); GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998); 
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 
(1991); HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 
(2008); PETER G. PETERSON, THE EDUCATION OF AN AMERICAN DREAMER (2009);Brian Cheffins & 
John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2008). 
10
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States approved Bank of America’s acquisition of Charles Schwab in 198443 and 
Bankers Trust’s commercial paper underwriting business in 1986.44
3. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Industry Consolidation 
  
The 1998 the merger of Citicorp and Travelers highlighted the trend.45 
Citigroup, the largest financial services company in the world, was created 
through the stock swap merger of Travelers (which owned SalomonSmithBarney) 
and Citicorp, the parent of Citibank. Finally, in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act was passed and partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act with the backing of 
Alan Greenspan and the Clinton administration. The GLBA allowed commercial 
banks to engage in the securities and insurance businesses.46
Since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks have 
aggressively pursued the highly profitable investment banking business. 
Commercial banks cited the following reasons for pursuing new fee-based 
businesses: first, they felt compelled to offer one-stop shopping for existing 
clientele; second, it was regarded as a necessary step to compete with European 
universal banks not restrained by regulations; third, cross-selling platforms 
appeared attractive; fourth, apparent cost savings were available through 
leveraging the existing client and industry knowledge base; and fifth, as 
competition intensified, they could provide credit to win capital markets 
business.
  
47 On the side of investment banking business, spreads narrowed and, 
accordingly, economies of scale increased. Computers and information 
technologies became increasingly powerful and sophisticated, specialized 
investment banking houses badly needed capital to operate at a commercial scale. 
Some of them were absorbed by commercial banks.48
                                            
43 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984); John S. Zieser, Note, 
Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Framework for 
Determining Permissible Bank Activity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1194 (1985).  
 
44 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The 
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987).  
45 See AMEY STONE & MIKE BREWSTER, KING OF CAPITAL: SANDY WEILL AND THE 
MAKING OF CITIGROUP 229 (2002). 
46 See Faith Neale & Pamela Peterson, The Effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on the 
Insurance Industry (Fla. State Univ., Working Paper, 2003).  
47 See PowerPoint, William T. Sherman, Conditions and Trends in the Investment Banking 
Industry: Presentation to the World Services Group, Inc., WORLD SERVICES GROUP 8 (May 7, 
2004), http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/powerpoint/Sherman.ppt. 
48 See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note __, at 279. 
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Only a couple of industry leaders remain solely focused on investment 
banking. Universal banks appear to be better positioned given their size and 
access to capital; however, such pure investment banks like Goldman Sachs and 
Lehman Brothers have maintained their market share since 1996. Universal banks 
like Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase experienced difficulty in integrating and 
aligning banking, sales and trading, and research. Pure investment banks were 
also well capitalized and were not handicapped for lack of capital (i.e. block 
trades) because most of them went public,49 and credit relationships both helped 
and hurt.50
C. Reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act? 
 
Much has been written on the global financial crisis.51
                                            
49 See id., at 237 – 238. For the IPO of Goldman Sachs, see ENDLICH, supra note __, at 415 
– 426. 
 This is not the 
place to repeat it. The financial crisis of 2008 occurred when banks and other 
financial institutions took huge risks. Several of the world's oldest and largest 
financial institutions collapsed or were on the verge of doing so. Government 
bailouts followed, but markets plummeted and credit dried up. The whole 
financial system was led to near collapse.  Financial products like credit default 
swaps and other financial derivatives became the target of public outrage. The 
crisis ignited discussions on the business model of financial services firms as it 
relates to the soundness of the financial system and the safety of the entire 
economy. As the crisis was international in nature, discussions have been made 
worldwide through international stages like the G20. 
50 Sherman, supra note __, at 13. 
51 See generally WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS (2009); STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, 
GODS AT WAR (2009); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO 
THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009); ALAN C. GREENBERG, 
THE RISE AND FALL OF BEAR STEARNS (2010); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 
(2010); DUFF MCDONALD, LAST MAN STANDING: THE ASCENT OF JAMIE DIMON AND JPMORGAN 
CHASE (2009); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK (2010); ANDREW SHENG, FROM ASIAN TO 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED 
WE TRUST (2009); Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1151 (2010); John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 
2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2009). For German literature on the global financial 
crisis, see Bernd Rudolph, Die internationale Finanzkrise: Ursachen, Treiber, Veränderungsbedarf 
und Reformansätze, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1 (2010) 
(Ger.). For the author’s account in the Korean language on which some parts of this article draws, 
see Kim Hwa-Jin, Eunhaeng-ui jibaegujo-wa eunhaeng isa-ui bupryuljeog chaeg-im [Corporate 
Governance of Banks and Bank Director Liability], 51-4 SEOUL L.J. 151 (2010) and Kim Hwa-Jin, 
Geul-lobeol geum-yung-wigi-wa geum-yungsan-eob-ui gujojaepyeon [The Financial Services 
Industry in the Global Financial Crisis: History and Strategies], 51-3 SEOUL L.J. 125 (2010).  
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Many blame the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act as one factor leading to 
the financial crisis.52 They believe that allowing commercial and investment 
banks to combine led to the current crisis, and that re-mandating separation would 
prevent a repeat of the financial crisis.53 Allowing commercial banks to engage in 
risky capital market related activities, while protecting them from failure through 
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve Bank’s discount window, 
created a moral hazard problem54 and an appetite for larger risks. Therefore, 
“some kind of separation between institutions that deal primarily in the capital 
markets and those involved in more traditional deposit-taking and working-capital 
finance makes sense.”55
Another argument in favor of reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act is that 
conflicts of interest may become more serious when commercial and investment 
banking activities are consolidated into a single financial institution,
 
56 
considering that conflicts of interest is by far the single most important issue for 
big investment banks.57
                                            
52 See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Arnab Das, Solutions for a Crisis in Its Sovereign Stage, 
FIN. TIMES (May 31, 2010), 
 Conflicts of interest within big banks are too complicated 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8eda2c3e-6cde-11df-91c8-00144feab49a. 
html. 
53 See Louis Uchitelle, Elders of Wall St. Favor More Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2010, at B1 
54 John H. Boyd et al., Moral Hazard Under Commercial and Universal Banking, 30 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING __ (1998). 
55 David Wessel, John Reed on Glass Steagall: Then and Now, Blog post on Real Time 
Economics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2009, 4:27 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/10/27/ 
john-reed-on-glass-steagall-then-now/. 
56 See Georg Rich & Christian Walter, The Future of Universal Banking, 13 CATO J. 289, 
306 (1993). For conflicts of interest, see generally ANDREW CROCKETT ET AL., CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY: WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THEM? (2003); 
Daylian M. Cain, The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005); Susanna Leong, Protection of Confidential Information Acquired 
from a Former Client: Are Chinese Walls Adequate?, 11 SING. ACAD. L.J. 444 (1999); Norman S. 
Poser, Conflicts of Interest Within Securities Firms, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111 (1990); Andrew 
Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 
478 (2005); Peter G. Klein & Kathrin Zoeller, Universal Banking and Conflicts of Interests: 
Evidence from German Initial Public Offerings (Contracting & Org. Research Inst., Working Paper 
No. 03-06, 2003).  
57 For conflicts of interest issues in takeovers, see Klaus J. Hopt, Takeovers, Secrecy, and 
Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards and Banks (European Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 03/2002, 2002) and Charles W. Calomiris & Hal J. Singer, How Often Do 
“Conflicts of Interests” in the Investment Banking Industry Arise During Hostile Takeovers? (Feb. 
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to control successfully. There are many empirical studies that support the conflicts 
of interest concern.58
Also, segregation of commercial and investment banking activities may 
be the way to address behavioral factors that can lead to global financial chaos. It 
is argued that segregation is the only way to prevent socio-psychological aspects 
of market behavior from leading to homogenization in global financial markets.
 
59 
Segregating financial institutions along business lines would prevent 
homogenization of financial markets on an international level, and thus reduce the 
potential for a local financial crisis to grow into a global one.60
2. Cons 
 
Conventional wisdom is that universal banks can provide consumers with 
a greater range of services and tend to have greater capital reserves to protect 
consumers against unanticipated losses. The universal banking structure provides 
economies of scale and scope to banks that enable them to offer services to 
customers at a lower price.61 It creates synergies as the use of deposits as a cheap 
source of funds may be employed across the border of the commercial banking 
business. 62
                                                                                                                       
24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=509562.  
 Universal banks are also better able to diversify risk. So some 
economists, banks, and powerful financial lobbies, including the Committee on 
58 See Wolfgang Bessier & Matthias Stanzel, Conflicts of Interest and Research Quality of 
Affiliated Analysts in the German Universal Banking System: Evidence from IPO Underwriting, 15 
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 757 (2009); Hedva Ber et al., Conflict of Interest in Universal Banking: Bank 
Lending, Stock Under-writing, and Fund Management Abstract (Ctr. For Econ. Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 2359, 2000); Klein & Zoeller, supra note 52., available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=223085;  
59  See Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and 
Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009). Avgouleas 
explains homogenization as “the widespread tendency of market players to move all in the same 
direction at once.” Id. at 28. Homogenization harms global financial markets by leading to 
“marked lack of pluralism in trading strategies and investment diversification, significantly 
increasing endogenous risk” and “depriv[ing] the global financial system from the balance 
provided by investment and financial activity diversification.” Id. at 48. 
60 See Avgouleas, supra note 55, at 48. 
61 Even commercial firms try to enter into the financial services industry. See Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539 
(2007) (urging Congress to enact legislation to prohibit acquisitions of FDIC-insured industrial 
loan companies by commercial firms). 
62 INT’L BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, A SURVEY OF CURRENT 
REGULATORY TRENDS 23 (2010) [hereinafter ‘IBA Report’].  
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Capital Markets Regulation63 and Paul Krugman,64 argue against regulation that 
newly requires the separation of commercial and investment banking. It has been 
strongly suggested that there is no connection between the failure of universal 
banking and the financial crisis. The U.S. banks failed due to the deterioration of 
their commercial banking businesses. Reinstating the Glass-Steagall divide would 
be unnecessary for financial reform because repeal of the Act neither caused nor 
worsened the financial crisis.65 After all, it was the bad lending practices and the 
subprime mortgage business, the core of commercial banking, that served as the 
primary causes of the financial crisis.66
Although the Glass-Steagall Act
 Regulations must therefore target bad 
lending practices that lie at the root of the financial crisis. 
67 prohibited commercial banks from 
underwriting or dealing in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the Act never 
prohibited commercial banks from buying and selling MBS as investment 
securities. 68  Thus, banks suffered losses from acting in their capacity as 
commercial banks, not from acting as securities firms. GLBA simply permitted 
securities firms and commercial banks to be affiliated with each other. It is 
unlikely that a bank securities affiliate or subsidiary of a commercial bank could 
significantly harm the financial condition of the commercial bank.69 To be sure, 
the expansion of commercial banks’ business areas over the years was also made 
possible through market practices and permissive policies of the administration 
and judiciary while the Glass-Steagall Act was still in force. Therefore, it may 
well be argued that the differences in detail between the Glass-Steagall and 
GLBA70
                                            
63 COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR 
REGULATORY REFORM 191–95 (2009). 
 are not significant. However, the repeal of Glass-Steagall, if not in its 
entirety, could have sent certain signals to the market and industries. The financial 
64 Paul Krugman, Glass-Steagall, Part Deux, Blog post on The Conscience of a Liberal, 
N.Y. TIMES(Jan. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/glass-steagal-
part-deux/. 
65 Peter J. Wallison, Did the “Repeal” of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the Financial 
Crisis? Not Guilty. Not Even Close 14–15 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State U., Policy Brief 2009-
PB-09, 2009). 
66 HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 108–09 (2009).  
67 For a good summary, see Ehud Ofer, Glass-Steagall: The American Nightmare That 
Became the Israeli Dream, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 527, 528–42 (2004). 
68 Wallison, supra note 4, at 6. 
69 Id. at 16-17. 
70 For a good summary, see Ofer, supra note __, at 543–50. 
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services industry may have taken advantage of the changes. In practice, 100 
percent-owned subsidiaries may be run as business units within one firm. 
The conflicts of interest problem with universal banking may have been 
exaggerated, and can be controlled through proper regulatory measures.71 One 
study shows that the conflicts of interest issue that was controversial at the time of 
the enactment of Glass-Steagall was in fact exaggerated.72 It goes further and 
argues that the universal banking system was more effective in controlling the 
conflicts of interest because of the sensitivity of universal banks’ reputation.73
Opponents of reinstating Glass-Steagall propose such alternative forms of 
financial regulation to further financial reform as limiting the amount of assets a 
single financial institution may hold and to increase capital requirements of 
financial institutions. Regulation should also focus on banks’ risk-taking activity, 
not on the size, and should mandate higher capital requirements relative to risk-
taking activity and impose limits on leverage ratios.
  
74 Canada is a good example 
of that approach. Proponents of universal banking, i.e., opponents of reinstating 
Glass-Steagall, highlight Canada as evidence that universal banking does not have 
inherent structural weaknesses and would not necessarily lead to financial crisis. 
Canada adopts the universal banking model, and Canada’s banking industry is 
dominated by five large banks that represent ninety percent of the market.75 
However, no Canadian bank failed during the global financial crisis. This can be 
attributed to alternative forms of regulation, including tighter lending standards, 
lower leverage ratios, and better regulatory oversight.76
D. The Volcker-Rule 
  
1. A Compromise 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act is also known as the Merkley-Levin 
provisions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest or simply as the 
“Volcker Rule.”77
                                            
71 BENSTON, supra note __, at 309–10. 
 It adds a new Section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 
72 Id. at 43–122. 
73 Id. at 205–11. 
74 Big Banks Needn’t Be Bad Banks, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/news/international-business/big-banks-neednt-be-bad-
banks/articleshow/5536770.cms.   
75 Id.   
76 Id. 
77 See generally, Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcer Rule and Goldman 
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1956. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker believed that commercial 
banks’ risk-taking activities needed to be constrained. He had been arguing that 
commercial banks should be prevented from taking advantage of the safety net 
provided by the government to make speculative investments. 78  Volcker 
proposed a new financial reform, which restores the “spirit” of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, but not the Act itself.79 President Obama endorsed this reform and named it 
the “Volcker Rule.” Rather than recreating a wall between commercial and 
investment banking, the Volcker Rule forbids commercial banks from owning or 
investing in hedge funds, private equity funds, and from engaging in proprietary 
trading.80 According to Simon Johnson, “[m]ismanagement of risks that involved 
effectively betting the banks’ own capital was central to the financial crisis of 
2008.”81 The Volcker Rule would “significantly reduce systemic financial risks 
looking forward.” Furthermore, the “separation between banks and the funds they 
sponsor, in any fashion, needs to be complete.”82
“[W]e should no longer allow banks to stray too far from their 
central mission of serving their customers.  In recent years, too many 
financial firms have put taxpayer money at risk by operating hedge funds 
and private equity funds and making riskier investments to reap a quick 
reward.  And these firms have taken these risks while benefiting from 
special financial privileges that are reserved only for banks. Our 
government provides deposit insurance and other safeguards and 
 President Obama articulated the 
thinking behind the rule:  
                                                                                                                       
Sachs (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 37, April 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809271.  
78 See David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts Power Away 
from Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/ 2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html?sid=ST2010012104948. 
79 See Damian Paletta & Jonathan Weisman, Proposal Set to Curb Bank Giants, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:16 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870432010457501 
5910344117800.html. 
80 It provides that no “banking entity” may “acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or 
other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” The Volcker-Rule is 
expected to become effective on July 21, 2012. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, IMPACT OF THE “VOLCKER 
RULE” ON NON-U.S. BANK INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE EQUITY AND HEDGE FUNDS OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2010). For proprietary trading, see generally MIKE BELLAFIORE, ONE GOOD 
TRADE: INSIDE THE HIGHLY COMPETITIVE WORLD OF PROPRIETARY TRADING (2010). 
81  See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). 
82  Letter from Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, 
Massachusetts Insitute of Technnology, to the Members of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (November 5, 2010). 
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guarantees to firms that operate banks.  We do so because a stable and 
reliable banking system promotes sustained growth, and because we 
learned how dangerous the failure of that system can be during the Great 
Depression. But these privileges were not created to bestow banks 
operating hedge funds or private equity funds with an unfair 
advantage.  When banks benefit from the safety net that taxpayers 
provide –- which includes lower-cost capital –- it is not appropriate for 
them to turn around and use that cheap money to trade for profit.  And 
that is especially true when this kind of trading often puts banks in direct 
conflict with their customers' interests. The fact is, these kinds of trading 
operations can create enormous and costly risks, endangering the entire 
bank if things go wrong.  We simply cannot accept a system in which 
hedge funds or private equity firms inside banks can place huge, risky 
bets that are subsidized by taxpayers and that could pose a conflict of 
interest.  And we cannot accept a system in which shareholders make 
money on these operations if the bank wins but taxpayers foot the bill if 
the bank loses.”83
The Volcker Rule requires that large banks cease to conduct proprietary 
trading and significantly limit their private-fund investments to three percent of 
the Basel II Tier 1 capital. The original version of the Rule stipulated a total ban 
on commercial banks’ private-fund investments. Banks have at maximum a 
seven-year grace period to comply with the Rule. Commercial banks can do 
certain derivative businesses only through their subsidiaries although this is not 
included in the Volcker Rule.
 
84
As for the restructuring of the financial services industry, President 
Obama articulated the thinking behind a rule that limits the size of single financial 
institution:  
  
“[A]s part of our efforts to protect against future crises, I'm also 
proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial 
system.  There has long been a deposit cap in place to guard against too 
much risk being concentrated in a single bank.  The same principle 
should apply to wider forms of funding employed by large financial 
institutions in today's economy.  The American people will not be served 
                                            
83 See supra note 2. 
84 For a good summary, see Bradley K. Sabel, Volcker Rule Continues to Garner Outsized 
Attention, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (October 31, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/10/31/ 
volcker-rule-continues-to-garner-outsized-attention/. 
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by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms.  That's not 
good for consumers; it's not good for the economy.  And through this 
policy, that is an outcome we will avoid.”85
The Volcker Rule includes the measures that curb the size of banks.
 
86 
Mergers and acquisitions amongst banks will be allowed only to the extent that 
combined liabilities did not exceed ten percent of the entire liabilities of all banks. 
This rule in fact may raise concern outside the United States in terms of mergers 
and acquisitions.87 However, most mergers and acquisitions would not surpass 
the rule.88
2. International Reach 
 
The Volcker Rule covers both U.S. banking groups and non-U.S. banking 
groups with U.S. banking operations.89 The rule applies to “banking entities.” A 
banking entity includes any company that is treated as a bank holding company 
for purposes of Section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 and any 
subsidiary or affiliate of that entity, e.g., foreign banks with U.S.-based branches 
and agencies. Accordingly, the rule affects virtually every major commercial and 
investment bank worldwide.90 To be sure, as there is no ability for a U.S. 
institution to shift business abroad to avoid the rule, foreign institutions might 
enjoy an advantage if they do business solely outside the United States.91
                                            
85 See supra note 2. 
 Alan 
Greenspan also has recently pointed out that U.S. offices of foreign institutions 
could readily switch proprietary trading to European and Asian, even Canadian 
86 See generally Michael J. Aiello & Heath P. Tarbert, Bank M&A in the Wake of Dodd-
Frank, 127 BANKING L. J. 909 (2010). 
87 How compliance with the Volcker Rule should be monitored and enforced is also a big 
question. See Simon Johnson, Proprietary Traders Earn `Trust, but Verify,' BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 
2010, 9:00 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-08/proprietary-traders-earned-
trust-but-verify-simon-johnson.html. 
88 See Matthew Richardson et al., Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in: REGULATING 
WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 181, 
196 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011) (noting that only Bank of America and JPMorgan 
Chase were to reach the threshold). 
89 The Dodd-Frank Act has been criticized for neglecting the international dimensions of 
the new financial order. See DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 175–76 (2010).  
90 Sabel, supra note __. 
91 Id. See also, Richardson et al., supra note __, at 207. 
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banks.92 Also, non-U.S. financial institutions covered by the Volcker Rule would 
generally be allowed to continue making investments and conduct private equity 
and hedge fund operations outside the United States if they are not controlled by a 
U.S. institution and do not sell ownership interest in the private equity or hedge 
fund to a U.S. resident.93
However, any significant non-U.S. financial institution has business 
interests in one way or another within the United States. Therefore, the Volcker 
Rule would have greater impact on the businesses of non-U.S. financial 
institutions than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did on the corporate governance 
of non-U.S. firms. Non-U.S. firms listed on a U.S. stock exchange are exempt 
from many, though not all, of the corporate governance requirements under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, provided that they disclose the differences between their 




III.  UNIVERSAL BANKING IN EUROPE 
 Such exemptions may not be available under the Dodd-Frank Act 
because it is not about foreign securities listed on a U.S. stock exchange, but 
about doing actual business in the United States. 
In the United States, the basic institutional framework established by the 
GLBA that allows universal banking will remain valid notwithstanding the new 
constraints introduced by the Volcker-Rule. The U.S. financial institutions will 
keep moving toward universal banking to achieve economies of scale and scope 
as soon as the restructuring of the financial services industry becomes complete. 
The discussions below put the developments in the United States in comparative 
perspective with the European system. 
A. A European Volcker-Rule? 
When the U.S. plan, including the Volcker Rule, was first publicized in 
early 2010, European Union finance ministers opposed the U.S. proposal to limit 
banks’ size and risk-taking. The Volcker Rule in the European Union might not be 
consistent with the current principles of the internal market and universal 
banking.95
                                            
92 See Greenspan, supra note __. 
 The Credit Institutions Directive of 2000 clearly adopted the universal 
93 For detailed discussions, see CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note __ and Sabel, supra note __. 
94 See, e.g., SEC Rule 10A-3(b)(iv), 10A-3(c). 
95 Meera Louis & Jurjen van de Pol, EU Finance Ministers to Resist Obama Plans for 
Banking Overhaul, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Feb 14, 2010, 6:42 PM EST), http://www. 
businessweek.com/news/2010-02-14/eu-finance-ministers-to-resist-obama-plans-for-banking-
overhaul.html. According to Simon Johnson, Europe faced serious difficulties because of failures 
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banking model in the European Union.96 In particular, the British Financial 
Services Minister Paul Myners suggested that he would prefer a capital 
requirement approach like the Basel Committee rules to the structural changes 
proposed by the United States to address risky bank trading activities. Curbing the 
size of big banks was not the best way to make the system safer.97 Germany and 
France also signaled that they would not follow the U.S. guidelines, raising 
concerns about banks coming to Europe to conduct their risky activities.98 If 
European banks were to be broken up or if their universal banking system was to 
be abandoned, they would be needlessly squandering one of their strengths. The 
European countries do not pay great attention to the Volker Rule’s restraints on 
commercial banks’ hedge fund and private equity investments because of the 
insignificant volume of businesses in those areas.99
On the other hand, the European Parliament adopted new rules for hedge 
funds and private equity in November 2010.
  
100
                                                                                                                       
to control the behavior of major banks. See Johnson, supra note __, at __.  
 The directive does not specifically 
govern banks’ hedge funds and private equity-related activities. It generally 
regulates those industries. Under the new rules, capital and disclosure 
requirements will be imposed on fund managers across the European Union. 
Managers will have to comply with such rules as covering, depositary 
arrangements, and pay and capital distributions. From January 2013, approved 
fund managers will be allowed to market their funds across the EU with the EU 
Passport, rather than continue to seek approval on a member country-by-member 
country basis. The EU Passport may be extended also to fund managers outside 
the member countries, including those in the United States, from 2015. Put these 
developments together with the Volcker Rule, and the U.S. banks may be a little 
96 Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, 2000 J.O. (L 126) 1. 
97 Huw Jones, Britain Studying High-Frequency Trading Concerns, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 
2010, 6:13 AM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/03/regulation-myners-
idUSLDE6120UU20100203? pageNumber=1. 
98 Id. 
99  Ronald Orol, European Delegation Reveals Rift on Volcker Rule, Bank Tax, 
MARKETWATCH (June 8, 2010, 7:00 PM EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/european-
delegation-reveals-rift-on-volcker-rule-2010-06-08. Cf. Eilís Ferran, Regulation of Private Equity-
Backed Leveraged Buyout Activity in Europe (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law 
Working Paper No. 84/2007, 2007). 
100 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC, COM (2009) 
207 final (Apr. 30, 2009). See Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament Ushers in New EU 
Rules for Hedge Funds and Private Equity (Nov. 11, 2010). 
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disadvantaged in the alternative investment sector. The developments and new 
rules, however, have been criticized as opportunistic as the reform had little real 
connection to the global financial crisis, simply taking advantage of the inevitable 
regulatory backlash after the crisis.101
B. A Brief Chronology
 
102
Investment banking in Europe originated in France. French banks were 
founded as universal banks in the early 1800s. Crédit Mobilier and Union 
Générale were the examples.
 
103 However, after Crédit Lyonnais and Société 
Générale decided to disengage themselves from universal banking,104 Germany 
and Switzerland became the places where universal banks grew large. 105
1. Germany 
 
Especially in Germany, investment banking came to play a more important role in 
financing industrial firms than anywhere else in Europe. Although the capital 
markets were not well developed in these states, banks remained very close to the 
industrial firms. Banks owned, supported and controlled the industrial firms. 
In 1848, Schaafhausenscher Bankverein was founded in Cologne. It was 
followed by Deutsche Bank106 and Commerzbank in 1870, and Dresdner Bank107 
in 1872. These banks were typical of universal banks run in close cooperation of 
industrial firms.108
                                            
101 See Eilís Ferran, The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in 
the Development of the EU’s Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 176/2011, 2011). 
 For instance, the family members of Siemens served on the 
102 See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1997); NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN 
WORLD, 1700–2000 (2001); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN 
EUROPE (1984). 
103 FLEURIET, supra note __, at 7. 
104 FLEURIET, supra note __, at 8. 
105 See J. Edwards & S. Ogilvie, Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A 
Reappraisal, 49 ECON. HIST. REV. 427 (1996); Caroline Fohlin, Regulation, Taxation, and the 
Development of the German Universal Banking System, 1884-1913, 6 EUR. REV, ECON. HIST. 221 
(2002). 
106 For a history of Deutsche Bank, see LOTHAR GALL, DIE DEUTSCHE BANK 1870-1995 
(1995) (Ger.). 
107 For a history of Dresdner Bank, see 1-4 DIE DRESDNER BANK IM DRITTEN REICH 
(Klaus-Dietmar Henke ed., 2006) (Ger.). 
108 See Robert B. H. Hauswald, On the Origins of Universal Banking: An Analysis of the 
German Banking Sector 1848 to 1910 (1998) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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board of directors of Deutsche Bank when the bank was established, and Deutsche 
Bank has remained the house bank (Hausbank) of Siemens even until today.109
During the Great Depression in the United States, U.S. banks called in 
loans made to Europe. The then largest bank in Austria, Creditanstalt, went under 
in 1931. Creditanstalt was founded by Rothschild in 1855 in Vienna. Panicked by 
the incident, Germany introduced exchange control after shutting down all banks 
for two days. German banks were eventually nationalized by Adolf Hitler in 1933. 
  
Deutsche Bank was the largest bank in the world before World War I. 
After the foundation, it underwrote bonds issued by Krupp, and brought Bayer to 
the Berlin Stock Exchange. After the War, however, it fell with the Weimar 
Republic. As Hitler came to power in 1933, Deutsche Bank discharged three 
Jewish directors and took part in the confiscation of Jewish property. It financed 
the Nazi’s secret police, Gestapo, as well as the construction of the concentration 
camp in Auschwitz. It became the house bank of IG Farben, Hitler’s war 
machine.110 After World War II, it was divided into ten local banks and it was not 
until 1957 when it was reinstated in Frankfurt. Deutsche Bank has been a 
universal bank since its establishment. But, its character has been a commercial 
bank largely due to the nature of a bank-centered German economy. From 1989 
on, however, Deutsche Bank has been aggressively expanding to the investment 
banking business along with the quick rise of the capital markets in Germany. In 
the same year, it acquired Morgan Grenfell and became a serious figure in the 
world investment banking industry. In 1999, Deutsche Bank acquired Bankers 
Trust, which acquired Alex Brown in 1997. Alex Brown was founded in 1800 and 
said to be the oldest investment banking house in the United States. In October 
2001, Deutsche Bank was listed on the New York Stock Exchange as the first 
firm listed after 9/11. Joseph Ackermann, who succeeded Rolf Breuer in May 
2002, started an aggressive campaign to change the character of the bank. His 
appointment to the head position of Deutsche Bank was due to his success in the 
investment banking operation of the bank. He even considered moving the bank’s 
headquarters to London.111
                                                                                                                       
sol3/
 Deutsche Bank acquired the Russian UFG (United 
Financial Group) in 2006.  
papers.cfm?abstract_id=6696. 
109 FLEURIET, supra note __, at 8–9. 
110 IG Farben used to be the fourth largest company in the world after GM, U.S. Steel, and 
Standard Oil. It was created through the merger of six firms, including BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and 
Agfa in 1925. See DIARMUID JEFFREYS, HELL’S CARTEL: IG FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF 
HITLER’S WAR MACHINE (2008). 
111 Martin T. Roth, Abschied von den Königsmachern der Deutschland AG, FRANKFURTER 
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Germany has been a bank-centered economy with less-developed capital 
markets.112 Therefore, German banks, although being universal banks, have been 
commercial banks in nature. However, things have changed since the 1980s due to 
the integration of capital markets from around the world and the economic 
integration of Europe. German banks have been trying to develop investment 
banking businesses, Deutsche Bank being the most notable example. The number 
of mergers and acquisitions amongst banks has also been increasing.113 German 
industrial firms have historically been under the practical control of German 
banks. It was understood as the secret of success and competition of the German 
economy. The German system was seriously studied by American scholars until at 
least the 1990s.114 However, the ownership of industrial firms by the banks was 
an obstacle for German banks in their strategy to develop investment banking 
businesses. Through the German banking industry’s request, the German 
government enacted legislation (Steuersenkungsgesetz) in July 2000 to waive 
capital gains tax for German banks’ disposal of shares in industrial firms.115 One 
of the strengths of universal banking is that the ownership in industrial firms gives 
access to corporate information. This, however, became unimportant in the age of 
mandatory disclosure, financial transparency and digital information116
                                                                                                                       
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 11, 2002, at 15 (Ger.).    
 while 
conflicts of interest remained.  
112 Industrial firms finance largely through commercial loans in a bank-centered economy. 
Loans are extended on a face-to-face basis. In crisis, parties talk, negotiate, and find solutions. On 
the contrary, in a capital markets-centered economy, parties do not know who the counterparties 
are. Firms finance through liquid securities and securitizations. In crisis, it is very difficult to find 
solutions through communications. 
113 See Michael Koetter, Evaluating the German Bank Merger Wave (Utrecht Sch. of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 05-16, 2005). 
114 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, 102 YALE L.J.1927 (1993). One study found that “firm performance 
improved to the extent that equity control rights are concentrated.” And, “bank control rights from 
equity ownership significantly improved firm performance beyond what nonbank block-holders 
can achieve.” Banks did not extract private value to the detriment of firm performance – German 
banks did not seek rent. It diagnoses that “perhaps this explains the German success despite of the 
ownership concentration.” Ownership concentration in the hands of financial institutions (not 
individuals or families) may not be that bad. The U.S. decision for weak banks might have been 
wrong after all. According to this research, “there was no evidence of conflicts of interest between 
banks and other shareholders.” See Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, Universal Banking and the 
Performance of German Firms, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (2000). 
115 BUS. WK., Nov. 19, 2001, at 31. 
116  Harold James, Goodbye and Hello to the Universal Bank, PROJECT SYNDICATE 
(October 29, 2001), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/james2/English. 
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The banking industry in Switzerland was created in the 14th century in the 
Geneva area. By the end of the 18th century, Switzerland became one of the 
international financial power houses of Europe. The neutrality of Switzerland 
made it possible to avoid involvement in wars and other armed conflicts. Ever 
since the Vienna Conference of 1815, Switzerland has maintained neutrality. 
Though it became a member of the United Nations in 2002, Switzerland has not 
joined the European Union. The neutrality of Switzerland was well preserved 
even during World War II.117 Its geopolitical stability attracted capital from 
around the world.118 This has been made possible partly because Switzerland 
maintained strong armed forces. 119  Mark Roe points out that Switzerland’s 
financial markets are unlike those in other civil law jurisdiction as by 1999, Swiss 
stock market capitalization as a fraction of its GNP exceeded that of the UK and 
the United States, and Switzerland was not occupied in the 20th century.120 With 
no deficits, Switzerland became an exporter of capital. The major importer of 
Swiss money was French aristocrats and monarchs. This contributed to the 
development of the Geneva area.121
When the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in the United States, 
Switzerland followed the U.S. model, along with Belgium, Italy and Sweden. 
Commercial banking and investment banking remained separated until the 1960s 
in Switzerland.
 When the wave of the industrial revolution 
reached Switzerland in 1850, big banks emerged in the country to finance the 
railroads. In the 1890s, power and tourist industries took off, creating more big 
banks.  
122 Like German banks, Swiss banks have also been commercial 
banks in nature,123
                                            
117 Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 
466 (1997). 
 but they have recently been strengthening investment banking 
activities in order to compete against U.S. financial institutions. Their core 
118 See INDEP. COMM. OF EMINENT PERS., REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF 
NAZI PERSECUTION IN SWISS BANKS (1999); GREGG J. RICKMAN, SWISS BANKS AND JEWISH SOULS 
(1999). 
119 Vagts, supra note __, at 469. 
120 See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
460, 509 – 510 (2006). 
121 ANDREAS BUSCH, BANKING REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION 164–65 (2009). 
122 FLEURIET, supra note __, at 14. 
123 Ernst Kilgus, Universal Banking Abroad: The Case of Switzerland, in SAUNDERS & 
WALTER, supra note __, at 245. 
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strategy was to acquire investment banking houses in the United States. Most 
notably, Credit Suisse acquired First Boston in 1978, and became Credit Suisse 
First Boston (CSFB). CSFB became Credit Suisse in January 2006. Swiss Bank 
Corporation (SBC) acquired the British Warburg124
C. Developments Since the 2008 Crisis 
 and U.S. Dillon Read in 1994 
and 1997, respectively. SBC merged with Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) in 
1998, and became United Bank of Switzerland (UBS). Warburg and Dillon Read 
became UBS’ investment banking arm. UBS’ business is larger in the United 
States than it is in Switzerland. 
1. Germany125
In Germany, specialized and local banks, not the large national banks, 
were hit first by the global financial crisis. In 2007, IKB (IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank) was bailed out by receiving government money in the amount of 
1.8 billion Euros and issuing convertible bonds and shares to KfW. KfW ended up 
owning ninety percent of IKB at the end of the day before it sold IKB shares to 
Lone Star, the Texas-based private equity firm, for 600 million Euros in October 
2008, losing more than eight billion Euros. IKB had invested heavily in structured 
securities through taking excessive leverage and short-term financing since 2001. 
Hypo Real Estate Holding (HRE) was next to get into trouble. By the end of 2007, 
HRE’s assets amounted to 400 billion Euros with heavy investments in CDOs 
related to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market. HRE’s Irish subsidiary, the Irish 
Depfa Bank, could not continue to refinance its long-term assets. By September of 
2008, it became clear that HRE’s failure could ruin Germany’s whole banking 
system. A bailout package in the amount of fifty billion Euros was arranged which 
increased to 100 billion Euros thereafter. It also turned out that the European 
financial supervisory system had cracks. As an Irish-licensed bank, Depfa was not 
subject to the direct supervision of BaFin, the German financial supervisory 
authority. In 2008, WestLB recorded trading losses of 600 million Euros in 2007 
and transferred bad assets worth twenty-three billion Euros to a special investment 
vehicle to remove them from its balance sheet. Again in October 2009, WestLB’s 
troubled assets with a nominal value of seventy-seven billion Euros were 
transferred into a bad bank for liquidation. HSH Nordbank (HSH) ended up 
possessing seventeen billion Euros of troubled real estate assets. It received a 
government guarantee worth thirty billion Euros. Some other Landesbanken 
followed suit. 
 
                                            
124 For a history of Warburg, see RON CHERNOW, THE WARBURGS (1994). 
125 See IBA Report, at 89–116. 
26
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 31 [2011]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art31
 28 
Ultimately, the big banks could not avoid the crisis. In January 2009, 
Commerzbank acquired Dresdner Bank from Allianz for 9.8 billion Euros while 
the German government provided Commerzbank with 8.2 billion Euros for 
twenty-five percent plus one share in the bank through the Special Fund for 
Financial Markets Stabilization (Sonderfond Finanzmarktstabilisierung: SoFFin) 
which was created by the Financial Markets Stabilization Act (Finanzmarktstabili-
sierungsgesetz) of 2008 and placed under the administration of a special federal 
agency Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt (FMSA).126 SoFFin was equipped with 
100 billion Euros cash plus up to 400 billion Euros guarantee issuing authority. 
The German Stock Corporation Act was partially preempted by the Act on the 
Acceleration of Financial Market Stabilization (Finanzmarktstabilisierungs-
beschleunigungsgesetz) to allow the troubled financial institution to issue new 
shares to the government without negotiating with the shareholders. The deal was 
also influenced by the new German restriction on foreign investment. 127 
Commerzbank managed to acquire Dresdner Bank even though China 
Development Bank made a higher bid. However, the merger between 
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank led to a lawsuit by the shareholders against 
their managers.128
The universal banking model incorporated in the European Union Credit 
Institutions Directive of 2000 was heavily influenced by Germany. The trouble, 
however, is that the German model completely integrates the commercial banking 
and securities business into one house in such a way that the central bank might 
become reluctant to play the role of the lender of last resort as far as the securities 
businesses are concerned. This was what happened in Germany in 2008. The 
depositors were highly concerned with the insolvency of the banks and therefore 
started to run on their banks. On October 4, 2008, the German government was 
forced to offer an unlimited guarantee for all private bank deposits.
 
129
                                            
126  DOROTHEA SCHÄFER, DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG [DIW 
BERLIN], GERMANY’S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AGENDA FOR A NEW FINANCIAL MARKET 
ARCHITECTURE (2009). 
 To 
convince the depositors that the commercial banking part of the universal bank 
would not automatically respond to the emergency support from the securities 
business part, a universal bank must be well equipped with a separation system. It 
is not an easy task, though. For that reason, German universal banks need to 
127  See Franz-Joerg Semler, CMS Hasche Sigle, Investments in Germany: New 
Restrictions for Foreign Investors (2009). 
128 Kauf der Dresdner Bank: Commerzbank gewinnt Rechtsstreit mit Aktionären, FIN. 
TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, July 12, 2010 (reporting that the judgement of the first instance was 
reversed by the high court in favor of the bank managers) (Ger.). 
129 Carter Dougherty, Germany Guarantees Bank Deposits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008. 
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slowly develop the structure of a financial holding or group130
2. Switzerland
 as the UK banks 
did. 
131
In Switzerland, banks dwarf the rest of the economy. This small country 
with some eight million people houses more than 200 banks.
 
132 UBS and Credit 
Suisse each have assets of more than one trillion Swiss Francs (USD900 billion), 
twice the size of the Swiss economy.133
The global financial crisis of 2008 also hit the Swiss banks hard, with 
UBS being hit the hardest. UBS wrote off 12.4 billion Swiss Francs in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 for losses from the subprime mortgage business. The year 2007 
was the year UBS recorded its first ever loss. UBS secured eleven billion Swiss 
Francs from the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and another 
two billion Swiss Francs from anonymous investors. In October 2008, the Central 
Bank of Switzerland bailed out UBS, investing six billion Swiss Francs to help the 
bank spin off USD39 billion of toxic assets into a Swiss National Bank fund. The 
federal state sold its 
 The balance sheet of UBS and Credit 
Suisse, when combined, is about four times Switzerland’s GDP. Switzerland 
thusly has a severe Too-Big-To-Fail problem. 
UBS holdings for a profit of 1.2 billion Swiss Francs less 
than a year later. Credit Suisse also recorded large losses during the same 
periods. 134
A panel appointed by the Swiss government has recently issued 
recommendations on ways to carve up 
 Credit Suisse secured new investments from investors in Qatar, 
declining government assistance.  
UBS and Credit Suisse,135
                                            
130  Even under the holding or group structure, there may be strong pressure from 
customers of securities business to pierce the corporate veil. See Report from Hwa-Jin Kim & 
Yong Jae Kim to the Korea Financial Investment Association, The Future of the Business of 
Investment Banking in Korea 97–107 (2010) (Kor.). 
 and Swiss 
131 See IBA Report, at 117–50; Jürgen Dunsch, Notoperation für Schweizer Grossbank 
UBS, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.faz.net/-00xpzz (Ger.); 
Lukas Hässig, Arme Schweiz, DIE ZEIT, Oct. 1, 2008, available at http://www.zeit.de/ 
2008/41/Finanzkrise-Schweiz (Ger.). 
132 According to data from 1994, the ratio of those employed in banking to the total 
number of employed was 3.14% in Switzerland, compared to 2.07% in Germany, 1.21% in the 
United States, and 0.64% in Japan. See BUSCH, supra note __, at 164. 
133 SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.swissbanking.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
134 BUSCH, supra note __, at 248. 
135 Anita Greil, Switzerland Tightens Bank-Capital Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703805004575606081308850798. 
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parliament has been discussing the implementation of those recommendations. 
The banks are required to draw up plans to separate units that are important for 
the country from businesses that would be allowed to fail in a crisis. Swiss 
regulators also gave UBS and Credit Suisse four years to raise their risk-weighted 
capital to as much as double the Basel II requirements. The Swiss regulators are 
seeking more power to break the two giants up before they collapse.136 Should 
another crisis erupt, the government will allow the banks to fail. However, the 
panel will not further consider banning proprietary trading and has dropped 
proposals to break up the lenders.137 Thus far, the Volcker Rule has not found 
support in Switzerland.138
3. A Note on the United Kingdom
 
139
During the financial crisis, the UK government bailed out banks with a 
combined balance sheet of more than two times the UK GDP, which was around 
USD2.7 trillion at the end of 2008.
 
140 As a result, the UK government now owns 
some eighty-three percent of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 100 percent of 
Northern Rock, etc.141
There is opinion in the UK that favors functional separation of financial 
services architecture. It emphasizes “narrow banking,” i.e., tight restriction of the 
scope and activities of commercial banks.
  
142
                                                                                                                       
html. 
 It has also been reported that the UK 
136 UBS website summarizes the virtue of universal banking as follows: “The legal entity 
group structure of UBS is designed to support the Group’s businesses within an efficient legal, tax, 
regulatory and funding framework. Neither the business divisions of UBS (namely Investment 
Bank, Wealth Management Americas, Wealth Management & Swiss Bank and Global Asset 
Management) nor Corporate Center are replicated in their own individual legal entities, but rather 
they generally operate out of UBS AG (Parent Bank) through its Swiss and foreign branches.” 
137 Elena Logutenkova & Dylan Griffiths, Swiss Too-Big-to-Fail Banking Rules Seek to 
Avert Icelandic Ending for UBS, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2010, 6:01 PM ET), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-05/swiss-too-big-to-fail-banking-rules-seek-to-avert-icelandic-
ending-for-ubs.html. 
138 See id.  
139 See IBA Report, at 55–88. 
140 Conference Presentation Materials, Charles Randell, UK Banking After the Crisis, 
Dodd-Frank and Other International Developments Affecting the Global Financial System After 
the Crisis 3 (Oct. 27, 2010). 
141 Six banks account for around eighty-eight percent of retail deposits in the UK. Id. at 5. 
142 See John Kay, Should We Have ‘Narrow Banking’?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE: THE 
LSE REPORT 208 (2010) (also arguing that “regulatory reform should emphasize systemic 
resilience and robustness, not more detailed behavioural prescriptions.). 
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considers separating commercial banking and investment banking143 although it 
is not certain if such a plan could be implemented. The Independent Commission 
on Banking, created on June 16, 2010 to consider structural and related non-
structural reforms to the UK banking sector, has been looking at separation of 
retail and investment banking, limits on proprietary trading and investing, and 
measures to reduce market concentration. 144 John Vickers, Chairman of the 
Commission, recently ruled out ideas for narrow banking. But he explored the 
idea that universal banks might be required to ring-fence certain riskier operations 
from their consumer businesses. According to him universal banking had the 
disadvantage that unsuccessful investment banking may bring down the whole 
bank, including the commercial banking arm. Although he indicated that the 
riskier operations of banks could be required to hold more capital rather than 
being split off from the bank completely, he rejected the characterization of 
investment banking operations as "casinos."145
As mentioned before, the British system has traditionally been 
characterized by independent developments of each financial services sector. This 
was so even though the UK did not have any regulation on the delimitation of 
financial services. However, the so-called Big Bang of 1987 stimulated the 
creation of universal banks in the United Kingdom. As the UK universal banks 
adopted the subsidiaries model, not the in-house model, the Bank of England did 
not see large contagion risk involved in the universal banking system.
 
146 Also, the 
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 introduced sophisticated Chinese wall 
requirements to regulate the conflicts of interest within the financial group.147
D. Exkurs: East Asia  
  
Japan requires the separation of commercial and investment banks as the 
U.S. occupation authority put the U.S. system in place in Japan after World War 
II.148
                                            
143 See SCOTT, supra note __, at 108. 
 However, the Japanese commercial banks have been engaged in securities 
144 Randell, supra note __, at 7. 
145 See John Vickers, How to Regulate the Capital and Corporate Structures of Banks? 
(Keynote speech given on 22 January 2011 at the London Business School and University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business conference on Regulating Financial Intermediaries - 
Challenges and Constraints). 
146 See Kim & Kim, supra note __, at 110–21. 
147 See CHARLES HOLLANDER & SIMON SALZEDO, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & CHINESE 
WALLS (2nd ed. 2004).  
148 BENSTON, supra note __, at 2.  
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underwriting since 1993. 149  It is reported that Japanese commercial bank’s 
securities underwriting benefits the issuer.150 Japanese commercial banks are also 
permitted to trade commercial papers. China requires segregation, too. 151 
Commercial bank deposits are the largest financial assets in China and its weight 
is relatively heavier than that of other countries. As far as the investment banking 
business is concerned, global houses like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
currently dominate the Chinese market. The global investment banking houses 
lead the privatization of State-Owned Chinese firms, investing in Chinese 
commercial banks at the same time.152
Korea has a plan for moving toward the universal banking system. The 
Korean government also has plans for the so-called ‘megabank’ that can be 
created through mega mergers amongst top commercial banks. The whole idea is 
that Korean banks are ‘too small to succeed’ in the global market.
 Thus far, Japan and China have not shown 
great interest in the regulatory developments in the United States, including the 
Volcker-Rule. 
153
                                            
149 See Jun-Koo Kang & Wei-Lin Liu, Is Universal Banking Justified? Evidence from Bank 
Underwriting of Corporate Bonds in Japan (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=641822.  
 As the initial 
step for moving forward, the Capital Market Integration Act (former Securities 
and Exchange Act) was enacted and went into force on February 4, 2009. This 
law consolidated five different laws into one body and now regulates securities, 
futures and asset management industries. The U.S. style investment banks have 
been introduced with the designation ‘financial investment company.’ Even 
though Korea requires segregation, commercial banks in Korea have been 
expanding into asset management and mergers and acquisitions businesses. They 
do investment banking activities through subsidiaries for now. However, 
150 See Ayako Yasuda, Bank Relationships and Underwriter Competition: Evidence from 
Japan, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 369 (2007).  
151 For capital markets in China, see K. THOMAS LIAW, INVESTMENT BANKING AND 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA (2007); David Eu, Financial Reforms and Corporate 
Governance in China, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNA’L L. 469 (1996); Li Guo, The Chinese Financial 
Conglomerate and Its Company Law Implications, 7 J. KOREAN L. 197 (2007); Benjamin L. 
Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 929 (2008); Hui Huang, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons 
from the Global Financial Crisis, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 219 (2010); CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J. 
T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA'S STOCK MARKETS (2006); CARL E. WALTER & 
FRASER J. T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL Foundation of China's 
Extraordinary Rise (2011). 
152 See FLEURIET, supra note __, at 78–83.   
153 See Kim Hwa-Jin, supra note __ [The Financial Services Industry in the Global 
Financial Crisis: History and Strategies].  
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investment banking business backed by and/or combined with commercial bank's 
infrastructure and strong capital base remains as Korean commercial bank CEOs' 
ambition. Being defensive, the financial investment industry in Korea keeps 
growing. Even after the failed attempt to take over Lehman Brothers in 2008,154 
the Korea Development Bank dreams to become one of the leading investment 
banks in East Asia. The regulatory developments in the United States, including 
the Volcker-Rule, have received much attention in Korea.155
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF UNIVERSAL BANKS 
 
After the financial crisis, bank corporate governance has become a hot 
issue. In particular, risk management and bank managers’ pay are the focus of 
discussion.156
Since the 1990s, the corporate governance and finance scholarships have 
produced much about legal origin and corporate governance.
 The corporate governance of banks is not directly related to the 
business structure of universal banks. However, the size and complexity of a 
financial institution may have impact on its corporate governance and vice versa. 
As seen above, the European countries basically want to keep the conventional 
universal banking system although they did witness problems inherent to the large 
and complex financial institutions. This would make corporate governance of 
universal banks a more significant issue than it was before. If they do not want to 
adopt the structural approach, prudential rule and corporate governance would be 
the alternatives. 
157 There is also 
discussion on the relationship between legal origin and banking systems.158
                                            




supra note __, at 212 – 216. 
155 See The Dodd-Frank Act and Its Impacts on Korea (Korean language material jointly 
prepared by the three major financial research institutes in Korea: Korea Institute of Finance, 
Korea Capital Market Institute and Korea Insurance Research Institute, March 11, 2011). 
156 See, e.g., Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions 
and Remuneration Policies COM (2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010). 
157 See, e.g., Roe, supra note __; Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” 
Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2009); Rafael La Porta et al. (LLS&V), Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); LLS&V, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLITICAL 
ECON. 1113 (1998). 
158 See Coffee, supra note __ (The Rise of Dispersed Ownership); Caroline Fohlin, Does 
Civil Law Tradition and Universal Banking Crowd Out Securities Markets?: Pre-World War I 
Germany as Counter-Example, 8 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 602 (2007); Brian R. Cheffins, Investor 
Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great 
Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=348480. 
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discussions below, however, focus on the corporate governance of banks, not the 
banks’ role in corporate governance. Despite its importance, research on the 
corporate governance of banks and bank directors’ liabilities has been relatively 
rare.159 The global financial crisis has stimulated discussions on bank corporate 
governance in the United States as well as in Europe.160
A. Risk Management 
 
1. Director’s Fiduciary Duty to Manage Risks 
Many claim that one of the causes of the global financial crisis is the poor 
corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions.161 Bank managers 
were not prudent and the board of directors of banks did not prevent risky lending 
practices. 162 Banks’ internal control system did not function properly. Bank 
managers’ risk appetite was too big, and they regularly ignored risk officers’ 
warnings, with Goldman Sachs and BNP Paribas163 being exceptions. Part of the 
bank managers’ aggressive attitude to risks can be attributed to their 
compensation system.164
                                            
159 For a discussion on the corporate governance of banks using data from 740 banks in 41 
countries to evaluate the independence of outside directors, see generally Daniel Ferreira et al., 
Boards of Banks (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 289/2010, 
2010). See generally Pablo de Andres & Eleuterio Vallelado, Corporate Governance in Banking: 
The Role of the Board of Directors, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 2570 (2008); Olubunmi Faleye & 
Karthik Krishnan, Risky Lending: Does Bank Corporate Governance Matter? (23rd Australasian 
Fin. & Banking Conference 2010 Paper, 2010); James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public 
Company Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, 
Working Paper No. 49, 2006); Hanna Westman, The Role of Ownership Structure and Regulatory 
Environment in Bank Corporate Governance (Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
 One study, after looking at 306 financial institutions in 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435041; BENTON E. GUP ED., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2007). 
160 For recent research, see The Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions: 
Lessons from the Crisis, 8 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst., Brussels, Belg.), 
Summer 2010; Corporate Governance and the New Financial Regulation: Complements or 
Substitutes?, 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst., Brussels, Belg.), Spring 2011. 
161 But see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock 
Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009).  
162 See Taylor, supra note __.  
163 See Nicholas Calcina Howson, Commentary, When “Good” Corporate Governance 
Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 48 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/ 
howson.pdf. 
164 For the relationship between bank performance and corporate governance during the 
financial crises, see Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, WHY DID SOME BANKS PERFORM BETTER 
DURING THE CREDIT CRISIS? A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE AND 
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31 countries, concludes that the higher the ownership of institutional investors and 
the ratios of bonuses in CEO compensation package, the higher was the tendency 
of risk taking.165
Banks are at the risk center.
 
166 A bank’s business centers on taking 
risks.167 The board of directors of banks determines the risk tolerance and the risk 
appetite of the bank, and develops business strategies based on that decision. 
Therefore, risk management is at the core of a bank manager’s duty.168 The 
severity of the 2008 financial crisis was very much about how big banks’ 
managers acquired and mismanaged huge risks169 and in the process damaged the 
rest of the financial market and industry, and the broader economy.170 Banks 
should construct corporate governance in a way that could maximize the value of 
the bank as a business organization and, at the same time, minimize the systemic 
risk.171 If banks’ managers took on excessive risk, they may have benefited the 
shareholders short-term, but harmed the shareholders in the long run through 
having externalized the costs to the system.172
                                                                                                                       
REGULATION (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 254/2009, 2009). For the 
corporate governance implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Quack 
Federal Corporate Governance Round II (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 10-
12, 2010). 
 One study even argues that boards 
165  David Erkens et al., Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: 
Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 249/2009, 2009). 
166 PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 333–34 (2008). 
167 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR’S BOOK: THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL 
BANK DIRECTOR 10–15 (1997); JAMES W. KOLARI & BENTON E. GUP, COMMERCIAL BANKING: 
THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK (3rd ed. 2005); HANNA WESTMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
EUROPEAN BANKS: ESSAYS ON BANK OWNERSHIP 5 (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 
(1988). 
168 Martin Lipton et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Risk Management and the Board 
of Directors (2008). 
169 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 
967 (2009). 
170 Letter from Simon Johnson to Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
supra note __. 
171 See generally George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 
16 CATO J. 17 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). For 
discussions on Germany, see Daniel Zimmer & Florian Fuchs, Die Bank in Krise und Insolvenz: 
Ansätze zur Minderung des systemischen Risikos, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 597 (2010) (Ger.). 
172 See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 1. 
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of directors of banks were not supposed to minimize the agency costs, but serve a 
public purpose such as stabilizing financial markets and politics.173 John Coffee 
is skeptical about empowering bank shareholders because the shareholders’ 
incentives might be to take greater risk through increasing bank’s leverage.174 
The European Commission’s Green Paper of June 2, 2010 questions whether 
shareholder control of financial institutions is still realistic.175 At this point, the 
entire discussion on the stakeholder model and sustainability comes back to 
life.176
2. Germany and Switzerland 
 
In 1998, Germany amended the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) to 
introduce the director’s duty to manage enterprise risk.177 Article 91, Section 2 of 
the Aktiengesetz provides that the management board shall take suitable measures, 
in particular surveillance measures, to ensure that developments threatening the 
continuation of the company are detected early.178
                                            
173 See J. R. Booth et al., Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation, 26 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1973 (2002). 
 Also, Section 4.1.4 of the 
German Corporate Governance Code stipulates that the management board of 
listed companies ensures appropriate risk management and risk controlling in the 
174 See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 5 – 6 
(“[T]he more shareholder-friendly the corporate governance regime is at a financial institution, the 
more that financial institution will ride the rollercoaster of having high earnings in the boom years, 
and falling earnings and near-bankruptcy in the down years”).  
175  See John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: 
Renaissance and Crisis 39 – 41 (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 175/2011), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691688. 
176 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: 
Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 129 (2009). 
177 One study finds that the German supervisory board’s (in-)competence in finance was 
related to losses in the financial crisis. See Harald Hau & Marcel P. Thum, Subprime Crisis and 
Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks in Germany (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2640, 
2009). 
178 The original language of the article is as follows: “Der Vorstand hat geeignete 
Massnahmen zu treffen, insbesondere ein Überwachungssystem einzurichten, damit den 
Fortbestand der Gesellschaft gefährdende Entwicklungen früh erkannt werden.” It may therefore 
be argued that the article only refers to “Entwicklungen” (developments), not “Risiken” (risks). 
However, there seems to be no difficulty in interpreting the article to duly recognize a director’s 
duty to manage risk. See THEODOR BAUMS, HOUSE OF FIN. GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT, 
RISIKO UND RISIKOSTEUERUNG IM AKTIENECHT (2010) (Ger.). 
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enterprise.179 Article 25a, Section 1 of the German Banking Act (Gesetz über das 
Kreditwesen - KWG) provides that an institution bank must have in place suitable 
arrangements for managing, monitoring and controlling risks and appropriate 
arrangements by means of which the institution's financial situation can be gauged 
with sufficient accuracy at all times. It also provides that an institution must have 
a proper business organization, an appropriate internal control system, and 
adequate security precautions for the deployment of electronic data processing.180 
Recently, the German Law on Modernization of Corporate Accounting (BilMoG) 
has introduced the concept of risk management into the German Commercial 
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB) and Aktiengesetz.181
It is interesting to see that the BaFin developed special rules for financial 
services firms that link the compensation issue to risk management. In August 
2009, it published an updated version of the Minimum Requirements for Risk 
Management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement). The rule 
requires financial institutions to maintain an appropriate risk management system 
pursuant to Paragraph 25 of the KWG, and then Section 71 of the rule addresses 
the parameters of incentive systems for bank staff. According to that, incentive 
systems must be harmonized with the general strategic targets of the bank. In 
particular, compensation systems must be designed so as not to encourage bank 
managers to take inappropriate levels of risks. Back office people, in particular 
those involved in risk control, have to also be compensated in a way that 
appropriately reflects their responsibilities.
 It remains to be seen how 
the regulatory developments will lead to better risk management in German 
universal banks. 
182
                                            
179  HENRIK-MICHAEL RINGLEB ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE KODEX 179–85 (3rd ed., 2008) (Ger.). 
 
180 AKTIENGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1032–39 (KARSTEN SCHMIDT & MARCUS LUTTER EDS., 
2008) (Ger.); HANDBUCH DES VORSTANDSRECHTS § 19 (HOLGER FLEISCHER ED., 2006) (Ger.); 
WERNER PAUKER, UNTERNEHMEN – RISIKO – HAFTUNG: DIE FUNKTION DER 
GESCHÄFTSLEITERHAFTUNG VOR DEM HINTERGRUND DER STEUERUNG UND VERTEILUNG 
UNTERNEHMERISCHE RISIKEN (2008) (Ger.).  
181 Michael Kort, Risikomanagement nach dem Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, 39 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 440 (2010) (Ger.). For the concept 
of ‘risk’ under German law, see SCHMIDT & LUTTER, supra note __, at 1036 and Jochen Pampel & 
Dietmar Glage, Unternehmensrisiken und Risiko-management, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: 
HANDBUCH DER HAFTUNGSVERMEIDUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN 84 (CHRISTOPH E. HAUSCHKA ED., 
2007) (Ger.). 
182 For legal rules and discussions regarding remuneration in Switzerland, see Kunz, supra 
note __, at 113–14 (calling the issue a “political hot potato” in Switzerland). 
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Swiss law also recognizes the directors’ duty to carry out risk assessment 
and risk management. They are obliged to define the company's risk appetite and 
tolerance and monitor possible risks. A director’s duty to manage risks was 
introduced in Article 663b of the Swiss Code of Obligations in 2008 although 
scholars regarded such a duty as given under Article 716a, Paragraph 1 of the 
Code.183
3. Bank Directors’ Liability 
 The Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance of 2002, as 
amended, effective January 1, 2008, encourages listed companies and 
economically significant private companies in Switzerland to set up audit 
committees for risk management. 
The German IKB’s former CEO currently stands trial for having misled 
shareholders and having breached fiduciary duties. He has been accused of not 
having properly managed risks involved in new financial products and economic 
developments. It is expected that the legal controversy over the scope of the 
business judgment rule will take place in terms of the management of the financial 
institution.184 Germany formally introduced the business judgment rule in Article 
93, Paragraph 1 of Aktiengesetz in 2005.185
A bank director can sign a risky contract with a third party on behalf of 
the bank by considering the interests of the firm. In such a case, whether it should 
be deemed as the director’s neglect of duty towards the corporation is not easy to 
answer at a glance. That is because it may be viewed as a breach of neither laws 
and regulations nor the articles of incorporation. Nevertheless, signing a risky 
contract may expose the corporation to the possibility of insolvency so as to deal a 
blow in achieving the company’s business objectives while affecting the reliance 
on the company placed by its interested parties such as its shareholders, officers 
and employees. From the perspective that a company does not exist solely for the 
purpose of seeking the financial interests of its shareholders, but is a social being 
that should be sustainable,
 
186
                                            
183 See Peter V. Kunz, Swiss Corporate Governance–an Overview, in SWISS REPORTS 
PRESENTED AT THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 99, 111–12 (2010). 
 such an act of a director may cause harm to the 
184 See IBA Report, at 93. 
185 Cf. ANDREA LOHSE, UNTERNEHMERISCHES ERMESSEN (2005) (Ger.). Article 754 of 
Swiss Code of Obligations stipulates directors’ duties and liabilities. Although the business 
judgment rule has not been formally introduced in Switzerland yet, Swiss directors can be 
insulated from liabilities by fulfilling similar requirements as those for the application of the 
business judgment rule in the United States and Germany. 
186  Cf. ANDRES R. EDWARDS, THE SUSTAINABILITY REVOLUTION: PORTRAIT OF A 
PARADIGM SHIFT (2005); CHRIS LASZLO, THE SUSTAINABLE COMPANY: HOW TO CREATE LASTING 
VALUE THROUGH SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (2003).  
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company as well as to all of its interested parties even though it is in the short-
term interest of shareholders. As banks create systemic risks, the sustainability 
consideration is more compelling to bank directors.187
The level of a director’s fiduciary duty owed to the corporation very 
much depends upon the size and business area of the corporation. The rule can be 
best understood in terms of bank director liability. Banks are required to 
contribute to the stability of the financial markets and to the development of the 
national economy. Therefore, for instance, the Korean Supreme Court once ruled 
that bank directors must fulfill their fiduciary duties with utmost (enhanced) 
care.
  
188 Swiss law also recognizes higher levels of duty owed by the directors’ of 
financial institutions.189 The conventional protection provided by the business 
judgment rule may be weaker for bank directors. Such fiduciary duties include the 
duty to properly manage risks as discussed above. By violating the duty to 
manage risks, bank director can be held liable to the bank and/or shareholders, 
depending upon the jurisdiction.190 The bank director may breach the fiduciary 
duty to the bank even when the director acted in the short-term interest of the 
bank if the act exposed the bank to higher enterprise risk and caused the bank to 
be responsible for the increase of systemic risk.191
B. Bankers’ Pay 
 
                                            
187 For a bank manager’s obligations under the various laws in the United States, see 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS (SECTION 501) 
(1998). 
188  See Hwa-Jin Kim, Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Corporate Control and 
Restructuring Transactions: Recent Developments in Korea, 2006 Oxford U. COMP. L. F. 2. 
189 See Kunz, supra note __, at 132. 
190 Under Article 401 of the Korean Commercial Code, a director may be held jointly and 
severally liable to third parties for any damages incurred by such third parties resulting in the 
failure of such director to perform his or her duties, either willfully or by gross negligence. This 
provision is unique in that it holds directors liable to third parties for breach of their fiduciary 
duties owed to their own corporation. Third parties regularly incur losses due to corporation’s 
breach of their contract. Therefore, it is puzzling and hard to understand why directors who 
decided to breach a third-party contract for the benefit their corporation and shareholders got held 
liable to third parties. The Korean Supreme Court and other Korean courts have had a difficult 
line-drawing problem and had to identify the circumstances where breach of a third-party contract 
done for the benefit of the company constitutes director's breach of fiduciary duty to the company. 
See Kim, supra note __ [Corporate Governance of Banks and Bank Director Liability]. 
191 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009); 
Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk after Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153 
(2010). 
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How to regulate the bankers’ compensation has been a hot issue since the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. It is now well known that compensation 
arrangements in the investment banking industry arguably192 motivated excessive 
risk taking. 193  The problem is, however, that no matter how the bonus 
arrangements were made, it was not to serve the shareholders’ interest. Most pay 
and bonus arrangements were linked to the actual performance of bank 
managers.194 Therefore, private ordering may not solve the problem satisfactorily. 
Rather, government’s direct intervention will do the job. The Dodd-Frank Act 
addresses the issue by requiring shareholders’ non-binding resolution for CEO 
compensation and the golden parachute (‘say on pay’)195
European countries have also introduced the regulation on bankers’ pay by 
promulgating guidelines. Under huge political pressure, banks in the UK, 
Germany and France moved to limit bonuses in 2009. In 2010, the European 
Union enacted legislation to force European banks to curb excessive pay to 
bankers.
 modeled after the UK’s 
shareholder advisory vote on directors’ compensation. The SEC has the authority 
to waive the requirement. Firms are required to set up a compensation committee 
with independent directors for that matter. Financial institutions with assets in 
excess of one billion dollars shall disclose compensation arrangement including 
performance-linked bonuses. 
196
                                            
192 See 9 RES. NEWSL. (European Corporate Governance Inst.), supra note __, at 5 
(summarizing John Coffee’s assertion that Dodd-Frank was premised on the still debatable 
assumption that flaws in executive compensation formulas were responsible in significant part for 
the crisis). 
 Bankers in the European Union will be barred from taking more than 
193 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion 
Paper No. 657, 2010).  
194 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 
(2009); Written Testimony Submitted by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and 
Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the 
Corporate Governance Program at Harvard Law School, Before the Committee on Financial 
Services, United States House of Representatives, Hearing on Compensation Structure and 
Systemic Risk (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/ 
Policy/FSC-written-testimony-June-11-09.pdf.  
195 Title IX, Subtitle E. Dodd-Frank’s say on pay became effective in January 2011. 
196 European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 7 July 2010 on the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC As Regards Capital Requirements for the Trading Book and for Re-Securitisations, 
and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2010)0274 (2010). 
Cf. Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies and Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector, Eur. Parl. Doc. INI/2010/2009 (2010). For the critical comments, see Guido 
Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10 
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thirty percent of their bonus in cash starting in 2011, and risk losing some of the 
remainder should the bank’s performance erode. Banks that do not fully comply 
with the rule will have to set aside more capital to make up for the risk. If national 
regulators determine that a bank’s compensation structure encourages risk, they 
can force the bank to place hundreds of millions of Euros more in its capital 
cushion as insurance. Banks that received government bailout funds would also 
have to justify the compensation of their managers to the governments. 197 
Switzerland, not a member of the European Union, has also introduced limits on 
banker’s pay.198
In the UK, the Financial Services Authority issued the final form of the 
revised Remuneration Code on December 17, 2010. The Code introduces 
significant restrictions on the way in which remuneration policies and structures 
are operated within financial institutions in the UK and beyond.
 
199 The Code 
builds upon international standards set by the Financial Stability Board at a 
European level and goes beyond those standards in a number of key respects.200
Germany enacted the Law on the Appropriateness of Board Member 
Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung – VorstAG). 
Under the VorstAG, the total compensation for executives must reflect both the 
duties and responsibilities owed by them as well as the overall financial situation 
of the company. The compensation contract must allow the downsizing of the 
compensation package in case the financial situation of the company deteriorates. 
The supervisory board members may be held liable if they determined an 
inappropriate compensation package for an executive. The annual general 
shareholders’ meeting is entitled to approve the compensation package.  
 
The Code, among others, subscribes to the principle of proportionality. 
                                                                                                                       
J. CORP. L. STUD. 73 (2010). 
197 Liz Alderman, Cap on Bank Bonuses Clears Hurdle in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/business/global/08bonus.html; Regierung 
will gegen Boni vorgehen, FAZ.net, Oct. 1, 2010, available at http://www.faz.net/s/ 
RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~E5FA9A1CB36C248039D7BADA76C5F
A759~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html.  
198  See Adam C. Pritchard, Populist Retribution and International Competition in 
Financial Services Regulation 24–25 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 10-004, 2010). 
199 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, THE UK’S FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY ISSUES 
THE FINAL-FORM REMUNERATION CODE 1 (2010). 
200 Id. 
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Executive compensation, including bankers’ pay, has been a big issue also 
in Switzerland.201 Upon a citizen’s initiative (the “Abzocker-Initiative”), there is 
going to be a national vote on the amendment of Swiss Federal Constitution.202 
The initiative covers a lot of ground, including proposal against rip-off salaries. It 
may not be understood as being designed solely for shareholder value, but it may 
also target some social goals.203 The text of the initiative actually states that it 
was made “[t]o protect the economy, private property and the shareholders and in 
the spirit of sustainable corporate management.”204 Amongst top Swiss banks, 
Credit Suisse seems to lead taking move on bonuses,205 whereas the UBS rather 
balks.206
C. The Role of the State in the Corporate Governance of Banks 
 
Government is neither the owner of big businesses nor their financier. 
However, government involvement in the corporate governance of private 
companies has been increasing recently for various reasons.207
                                            
201 For legal rules and discussions regarding remuneration in Switzerland, see Kunz, supra 
note __, at 113 – 114 (calling the issue as “political hot potato” in Switzerland). See Banker-Boni 
und die Politik, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Sept. 4, 2010, available at, 
 The failure of any 
of a few very large corporations, including financial institutions, can take down a 
big part of the economic system. It may also have adverse impacts on the job 
markets which are politically sensitive. Government arranges acquisitions, 
http://www.nzz.ch/ 
nachrichten/wirtschaft/aktuell/banker-boni_und_die_politik_1.7441425.html. 
202 Der Lohn endet bei 3 Millionen Franken, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Dec. 17, 2010, 
available at, http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/der_lohn_endet_bei_3_millionen_ 
franken_1.8713070.html. 
203 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
14 (2010) (survey examining compensation structure in SMI and SMIM companies as well as say-
on-pay). 
204 For the full text of the initiative, see Alexander F. Wagner & Christoph Wenk, Say-on-
Pay in Switzerland: Binding Say-on-Pay and Its Impact on Shareholder Value (Working Paper, 
2010). 
205 See Katharina Bart, Credit Suisse Takes Risky Move on Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 
2011, available at. http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/01/10/credit-suisse-takes-risky-move-on-
bonuses/?KEYWORDS=Credit+Suisse+Takes+Risky+Move+on+Bonuses. 
206 See UBS informiert später über Boni, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Feb. 4, 2011, available 
at. http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/wirtschaft/aktuell/ubs_bonus-zahlungen_1.9351163.html. 
207  See generally Jeff Gordon, The Government as Investor/Owner in the U.S., 
TRANSATLANTIC CORP. GOVERNANCE DIALOGUE (Sept. 2009), http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2009/pres
e n t a t i o n s / g o r d o n . p d f ; Gerard Hertig, The Government as Investor/Owner in Europe, 
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sometimes providing the bailout funds to facilitate the deal. For strategically 
crucial companies, government acts as the guardian against foreign capital as was 
exemplified in the Unocal and Dubai Ports World208 cases. The concept of 
national security209 is being replaced by the concept of systemic importance. The 
global financial crisis has called some old principles into question. For the first 
time in its history, the U.S. government holds major ownership stakes in large 
companies and financial institutions and is playing an increasingly active role in 
their governance.210
The role of government has traditionally been important in the financial 
services industry. As there are such stakeholders for commercial banks as 
depositors and deposit insurance institutions, government has reasons to get 
involved in the corporate governance of commercial banks.
  
211  In emerging 
jurisdictions, large banks have mostly been privatized recently. Their government 
and banks are therefore in the shadow of a still fresh memory of the past. The role 
of the state has become even more significant after the financial crisis as many 
large banks in the United States and Europe were bailed out by the governments. 
Although governments now hold a dominant position in the corporate governance 
of banks, they are not in the position to effectively manage the banks. Therefore, 
the status of the governments in the bank corporate governance needs to be 
determined in a way to assist the financial regulatory reform in the United States 
as well as in Europe.212
                                            
208  See Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the Dubai Ports 
Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance Foreign Threats to 
National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. CORP. L. 293 (2008); 
 
Deborah M. 
Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a Tempest in a 
Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583 (2007). 
209 See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2006). 
210 See Kim Hwa-Jin, Gi-eop-ui so-yuji-baegujo-wa jeongbu-ui yeoghal [Government in 
Corporate Governance], 408/409 KOREAN BAR ASS’N J. 60/23 (2010) (Kor.). 
211 Cf. Jennifer Carpenter et al., Reforming Compensation and Corporate Governance, in: 
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 493, 506 – 507 (VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL. EDS., 2011). 
212 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder 
(Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-10, 2010) (“Corporate law provides 
a complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect noncontrolling shareholders 
from controlling shareholders who have goals other than maximizing firm value, but are designed 
with private parties in mind. We show that when the government is the controlling shareholder, the 
Delaware restrictions are largely displaced, but hardly replaced, by federal provisions. When GM 
goes public again, government ownership of a controlling position will be a significant ‘risk 
factor.’”) 
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V. A GLOBAL STRUCTURAL REGULATION? 
A. Convergence in Financial Regulation 
Since the 1980s, national corporate governance systems have been the 
focus of numerous academic studies. Good corporate governance law and practice 
were believed to be competitive forces not only for individual firms, but also for 
national economies. Comparative corporate law studies 213  and convergence 
theories214 gained much attention accordingly. Now, it is about time to (re)focus 
on financial regulatory systems of the world in terms of competition and 
convergence. As Bernard Black did suggest it for comparative corporate 
governance studies,215 many of the core problems of financial regulatory system 
are universal, and, accordingly, the range of reasonable solutions may be finite. 
Universal banking and its regulatory issues need to be studied seriously in order to 
understand the origins of structural differences of financial markets and financial 
services industries. Comparative financial system and regulation must regain its 
importance in academia and practice. As Adam Pritchard puts it, regulation on big 
banks will converge over time, but jurisdictional competition for hedge funds will 
be one of the most important topics in the future.216 We need to know whether 
different structures achieve distinct level of performance and the structural 
differences are the sole result of different regulatory attitudes.217
                                            
213 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 367 (1996); Brian Cheffins & Bernard Black, Outside Director 
Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of 
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002); MARK J. 
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL. EDS., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 2ND ED. (2009); Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of 
Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and 
Administrative and Criminal Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Bernard Black et al., Legal 
Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds for Liability, 2007 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 614. 
  
214 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __; RANDALL K. MORCK ED., A HISTORY 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL 
MANAGERS (2005). 
215 See Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: 
Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 544 (2001). 
216 See Pritchard, supra note __ at __. 
217  See Alfred Steinherr, Performance of Universal Banks: Historical Review and 
Appraisal, 2 in: SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note __, at 2. 
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The efficiency and (international) competitiveness of financial institutions 
are an inherent part of any country's development strategy. Economies of scale 
and scope are the primary goal of the banking business as it is in other businesses. 
Big banks and universal banks are an attractive model, including to bank 
managers, shareholders and employees; but ironically, big banks and universal 
banks can create systemic risk easier than smaller and specialized banks. It can 
ruin the entire economy. This is the dilemma most governments face. It is part of 
the tensions between regulation and competition that can never be resolved once 
and for all as Davies and Green put it.218 The solutions are different as the 
economic and political situations are different, but at the same time, no financial 
system is isolated from others. Convergence and persistence will be an important 
topic in this area in the coming years. Comparative financial system study,219 
therefore, may benefit the evolution of international financial regulation.220
The Volcker-Rule may set the direction for international guidelines for 
the structure of doing banking business also outside the United States as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did in international corporate governance.
 
221 
Although governments will differ in opinions in respect of the substance of the 
Volcker-Rule, they will not have serious problem on agreeing on the core 
proposition behind the Volcker-Rule that the commercial banking activities of a 
universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their 
customers. Such guidelines may well shape the structure of large international 
banks’ businesses in future. Corporate governance of financial institutions may be 
a good starting point.222
                                            
218 HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE ESSENTIAL 
GUIDE 29 (2009) 
 As shown above, there is a significant convergence in 
law and practice of corporate governance (of banks) amongst the United States, 
Germany and Switzerland. It is not something that was created through European 
countries’ responses or adaptation to the developments in the United States and 
U.S. system. It has been made possible because the governments agree on such 
219 For a survey, see Joseph Haubrich & James B. Thomson, Comparative Financial 
Systems: Introduction, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 421 (1998) and Franklin Allen & 
Douglas Gale, Comparative Financial Systems: A Survey (Ctr. for Fin. Insts., Working Paper No. 
01-15, 2001). 
220 Whether there existed a relationship between regulatory structure and financial stability 
is a controversial issue. See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note __, at 205–06. Cf. Jiandong Ju & Shang-
Jin Wei, When Is Quality of Financial System a Source of Comparative Advantage? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13984, 2008).  
221 Cf. Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1857 (2007).  
222 See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note __, at 239-50. 
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basic propositions of corporate governance of banks as risk management, 
management accountability and transparency.  
B. Allocation of Regulatory Authority 
To be sure, it is hard to foresee whether a meaningful international 
regulatory arrangement could be made. It will not be easy to create international 
rules for the business structure and conduct of financial institutions. Governments 
have incentives to cooperate with other governments but only to the extent that 
they achieve their own policy goals. Nevertheless, incentives to cooperate on the 
global level are far greater than so far due to the severity of the financial crisis, the 
stage of global integration of financial markets,223 and the activities of financial 
institutions. Scholars have emphasized the need for ongoing coordination and 
cooperation between European and U.S. regulators for the effective supervision of 
financial conglomerates.224 National financial systems will converge at least for 
the time being and an international standard will emerge. International supervision 
and prudential regulations have been proven to be feasible and work well in 
practice. John Coffee also predicts international convergence in financial 
regulation supporting the contingent capital alternative.225 The future of universal 
banking and big global financial institutions will be determined by such standards. 
This may be different than it has been in the corporate governance area where 
formal convergence has been proven most difficult due to various path-
dependence-related factors.226
The approach to the issue of the allocation of regulatory authority
 
227
                                            
223  Stock exchange mergers continue. See NYSE, Deutsche Börse Talk Tie-Up as 
Competition Intensifies, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 10, 2011), 
 
should not be de facto extraterritoriality or forced harmonization, though. Such an 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704858404576134153000503870.html. See also Roberta S. Karmel, The 
Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007). 
224 Kern Alexander, Eilis Ferran, Howell Jackson & Niamh Moloney, A Report on the 
Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue 28 – 31 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper 
No. 576, January 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961269. 
225 John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate 
Systemic Risk (Columbia Law School, Working Paper No. 380/2010, 2010). Contingent capital is a 
debt security that can automatically be converted into equity to avoid bankruptcy. The Dodd-Frank 
Act authorizes the Fed to mandate the use of contingent capital. See Section 165(b)(1)(B) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
226 Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999). 
227 For an early discussion on the proper allocation of global regulatory authority, see 
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approach may arguably cause jurisdictional conflicts228 and a race to the bottom 
through competition among governmental bodies. The Dodd-Frank Act grants 
U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear securities actions brought by the SEC or the 
Justice Department that involve extraterritorial elements.229 Also, as indicated 
above, the Dodd-Frank Act could operate along similar lines to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s effects on international corporate governance. For example, Section 
173 of the Dodd-Frank Act stipulates access guidelines to the U.S. financial market 
by foreign firms. The SEC is authorized to refuse to register foreign brokers that 
present a risk to the U.S. financial system and have a home country that has not 
adopted or progressed toward adopting financial regulation to mitigate that risk. 
David Skeel points to the provision as an attempt to force harmonization of 
international financial regulation.230 The speculation is that the provision aims to 
force other countries to put regulatory structures similar to the Dodd-Frank Act in 
place, or face with consequences against their own firms.231
C. The Role of the Basel Committee 
 The approach is not 
productive. The Unites States, and any other state in the world, should not use 
foreign firms, either listed on its stock exchange or doing business within the state, 
in its foreign policy enforcement. If the United States wants to achieve 
harmonization, it should do so through an international forum and/or international 
rule-making agency. The substance of the Volcker-Rule can be housed in an 
international rule to be effectively disseminated to outside of the United States.  
Convergence in the regulation of financial institutions can be achieved 
through voluntary, not forced, harmonization. The European Union has been 
successful in harmonizing national standards in capital markets law232
                                                                                                                       
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 649 (2001). 
 through 
228 As far as the U.S. securities law is concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently put 
limits on its extraterritorial reach: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, June 24, 2010, http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.pdf. See generally Erez Reuveni, 
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the 
Securities Laws, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1071 (2010); Amir Licht, Xi Li & Jordan I. Siegel, What 
Makes the Bonding Stick?: A Natural Experiment Involving the Supreme Court and Cross-Listed 
Firms (Harv. Bus. School Working Paper 11-072, 2011).  
229 Sections 929P(b), 929Y. 
230 SKEEL, supra note __, at 184. 
231 Id. Others suggest that this may also be an attempt to reduce regulatory arbitrage. See 
MAYER BROWN, UNDERSTAND THE NEW FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION: THE DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 105 (2010). 
232  See EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET (2005) (discussing the 
fundamental issues concerning the legal framework that has been established to support a single 
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reciprocity and commonality principles. 233
As the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision already has created 
guidelines for corporate governance of banks,
 The IOSCO has also been doing 
excellent works on creating centralized set of minimum standards in the securities 
regulation. Convergence in bank corporate governance is not the product of forced 
harmonization and therefore amenable to international rules. Financial regulations 
should follow suit. 
234 it can also be instrumental in 
creating the international rules for the structure of banking businesses. The Basel 
Committee already has excellent track records in making and implementing the 
prudential rules. Its rules are well complied even by non-member states of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) due to their nature as soft law.235 As the 
Committee itself states, it is “best known for its international standards on capital 
adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the 
Concordat on cross-border banking supervision.”236 The author once suggested 
that the BIS rules greatly influenced corporate governance of Korean companies 
through the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in the regulatory 
reform process in Korea after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 237  If the 
Committee promulgates relevant rules for the structure of banking business, the 
rule may have strong normative power through similar mechanism.238
                                                                                                                       
EU securities market). 
 Again, if 
member states are still not ready to accept such an approach, the Committee may 
expand and strengthen the power of prudential rules and improve the bank 
corporate governance.  
233 See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities 
Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 207 (1999); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 55(2011). 
234 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS (1999); BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS (2006); INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
CORPORATION, THE 2006 BCBS GUIDELINES ON ENHANCING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR 
BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (2006). 
235  See Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries 
Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647 (2002); Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle 
Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1998). 
236 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/. 
237 Cf. ANDREW SHENG, FROM ASIAN TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009). 
238 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 J. KOREAN L. 1 (2001). 
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Article reviewed the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the GLBA. It 
analyzed the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act in terms of 
the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act from a comparative perspective. Many 
countries developed the plan for moving toward the universal banking system that 
has been prevalent in Europe and the United States since the enactment of the 
GLBA. This Article concludes that the developments and discussions in the 
United States have been shaped largely through politics in the United States then 
and now. The United States once separated commercial banking and investment 
banking for political reasons. The separation was abandoned for economic reasons, 
and partially restored again for largely political reasons. The whole process was 
uniquely American. To support the argument, this Article looked into the situation 
in Europe, in particular in Germany and Switzerland; however, this Article 
generally agrees with the proposition that the commercial banking activities of a 
universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their 
customers, and proposes that international rules for the business structure and 
conduct of financial institutions including the proposition could be possible. 
Convergence in bank corporate governance is a good indication for one in 
financial regulation. 
Transatlantic differences in the financial system and structure of banking 
business can be attributed to political and historical factors. Banks are under the 
strong influence of the history and politics of their states of origin and places of 
business, and their strategy is determined by such factors. However, the practices 
and strategies of financial institutions in the United States and Europe seem to 
converge toward each other. The U.S. financial institutions have been pursuing 
the European universal banking model ever since the Glass-Steagall Act was 
enacted. European universal banks have been expanding into the investment 
banking business through aggressive acquisitions as well as organic growth. Over 
time, two sides of the Atlantic may look much alike as far as the structure of 
banking business is concerned. It seems that the global financial crisis has 
contributed to the trend. Now it is time for legal reform to follow the 
developments in practices. To maintain current levels of standards of living, we 
need to keep financial complexity as it is today239
 
 and develop the regulatory 
sophistication by which the global economy could benefit from the financial 
services on the global scale. 
                                            
239 See Greenspan, supra note __. 
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